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ABSTRACT
In 2000, Britain enacted a “right to roam” in the Countryside and Rights of Way
Act (CRoW). At first glance, CRoW appears to be a dramatic curtailment of the
landowner’s traditional right to exclude: it opens up all private land classified as
“mountain, moor, heath, or down” to the public for hiking and picnicking. Yet, when
viewed in the light of history, CRoW may be seen as partially restoring to the commoner
rights lost during the enclosure period, when the commons system ended. CRoW also
represents a return to a functional rather than spatial form of land ownership, allowing
more than one party to have rights in a particular piece of land. The new law highlights
some important public values regarding freedom of access that have been all but for
forgotten in the United States. The law calls into question U.S. Supreme Court precedent
that has enshrined the right to exclude as an “essential” stick in the bundle of property
rights and serves as a powerful alternative to the Court’s formalistic notion of property
rights. Although, given the differences in our history, culture, and legal systems, the
United States is unlikely to follow Britain’s lead in enacting a right to roam, the study of
CRoW contains valuable lessons for Americans.
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Britain's Right to Roam: Redefining the Bundle of Sticks
Jerry L. Anderson1
“No man made the land: it is the original inheritance of the whole species.... The land of
every country belongs to the people of that country.”
- John Stuart Mill2
I. Introduction
At least since Blackstone, property rights discourse has been plagued by
absolutism, the notion that the right of property should be defined as the “sole and
despotic dominion” over the res, to the “total exclusion of the right of any other
individual in the universe.”3 Property professors and courts generally refer to the
collection of rights that private property owners enjoy vis-a-vis other landowners and the
public as a “bundle of sticks,” in an attempt to render rather abstract concepts more
concrete.4 The prevailing metaphor, however, lends itself to a formalistic, absolutist
conception of these interests, implying that the sticks, such as the right to devise or the
right to convey, are things, much like your car or your house; therefore, the composition
of the bundle must be an immutable and essential state of affairs.5
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In contrast, many scholars insist that property rights are neither static nor
absolute. The recognition of private property interests involves trade-offs with
community values and egalitarian goals and, therefore, the exact composition of the
bundle of sticks must be recognized as a mediation between these interests.6 Moreover,
the balance struck is always tentative, subject to constant re-evaluation in light of current
needs and norms.7 Certainly, the relative stability of property rights over time is not only
fair to those who strive to obtain them, but is also desirable for society to function.8
Nevertheless, some evolution in our conception of the proper scope of property rights is
both inevitable and desireable.
The United States Supreme Court has furthered a formalistic, absolutist
conception of property rights by adopting the bundle of sticks metaphor and placing the
landowner’s “right to exclude” at the top of the woodpile. In a series of cases, the
Supreme Court has canonized the right to exclude others as “essential” to the concept of
private property.9 Completely absent from the Court’s analysis is recognition that the
landowner’s right to exclude involves a balance with the public’s interest in access. The
public may desire access to these lands for the purpose of reaching some public
destination, such as a beach or park, or it may value access for its own sake, to enjoy the
6

Robert C. Ellickson, “Property in Land,” 102 YALE L. J. 1315, 1345 (1993)( property systems are “a
major battleground” on which the conflict “between individual liberty and privacy on the one hand and
community and equality on the other” is resolved).
7
See Laura S. Underkuffler, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER, at 93 (2003)(“All
individual and public claims [to property] are subject to dispute, discard, evolution, and change, as
societally constructed understandings”); Eric T. Freyfogle, “Eight Principles for Property Rights in an Antisprawl Age,” 23 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 777, 785-86 (1999) (property rights and ownership
norms evolve over time); Maria gren, “Asserting One’s Rights: Swedish Property Law in the Transition
from Community Law to State Law,” 19 LAW & HIST. REV. 241, 243 (2001) (property rights systems
change over time, citing historical analyses of property rights).
8
Freyfogle, “Eight Principles,”at 785 (property rights must be relatively stable to serve economic
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9
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
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aesthetic values the private land and its surroundings offers. While the public interest
has figured into a few state court decisions on access,10 the Supreme Court has not so
much as mentioned it in upholding a seemingly absolute right to exclude.
Blackstone’s descendants, in contrast, take a much different view of the balance
of interests. Britain’s11 recent enactment of a “right to roam” in the Countryside and
Rights of Way Act 2000 (CRoW)12 provides a fascinating study of how the right to
exclude may be modified to accommodate public needs without unduly impacting the
interests of the private landowner. CRoW classifies private land that contains mountains,
moors, heath or downland13 as “open country,” and requires landowners to allow the
public to roam freely across these lands. CRoW opens up millions of acres of private
land to public access, without compensating the landowners for this limitation on their
right to exclude. As a result, the law represents a dramatic shift in the allocation of the
bundle of sticks.
The impetus for CRoW can be understood fully only by delving into British
history and culture. Britons have long valued public access to the countryside, so that the
public can fully enjoy its amenities.14 The romantic vision of a rural walk is enshrined in
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Throughout this article, I have used the term “Britain” as the subject of study. Great Britain, which
comprises England, Wales and Scotland, is technically only a part of the political entity, the United
Kingdom, which also includes Northern Ireland. However, many of the laws and regulations to which this
comparative study refers apply only to England and Wales. Therefore, the reader should be aware that
procedures, laws, and the names of the agencies involved may differ in Scotland and Northern Ireland. In
most instances, I have not noted those distinctions, because they are not relevant to my purpose and would
unnecessarily complicate the article.
12
Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000, avail. athttp://www.opsi.gov.uk/Acts/acts2000/20000037.htm.
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Downland is defined as “unimproved grassland with scattered scrub.” Countryside Agency, Mapping
Methodology.
14
See Marion Shoard, A RIGHT TO ROAM: SHOULD WE OPEN UP BRITAIN'S COUNTRYSIDE? 1-2 (1999)
(British have "fierce attachment to their countryside," which is part of the country's "collective identity").
11
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English literature, from the poetry of William Cowper,15 John Clare,16 Thomas Hardy,17
and William Wordsworth18 to the novels of Jane Austen.19 Numerous public footpaths
crisscross private lands and both the government and private groups such as the Ramblers
Association zealously guard these rights-of-way against encroachment.20 Under a theory
of implied dedication, British courts have consistently recognized the public right to
enjoy common rights to certain private lands historically used by the citizenry.
But these rights, as extensive as they may seem to outsiders, have never satisfied
the British public, due primarily to class outrage with an historical basis. The burr under
the saddle of public access rights occurred during the enclosure period.21 As more fully
explored below, enclosure converted communal land into private land, profoundly
affecting commoners’ rights and English society in general. Although many public
footpaths were preserved by enclosure orders, the public’s access to many areas over
which they previously enjoyed a general right to roam was summarily extinguished.
15

See, e.g., Tim Fulford, “Cowper, Wordsworth, and Clare: The Politics of Trees,” 14 JOHN CLARE SOC’Y
J. 47 (1995) (available at www.johnclare.info)(“Cowper found in the landscapes of Buckinghamshire the
virtues he had sought and failed to find in polite society. They were for him places from which order,
morality, even love could be derived when it could not from the actions of gentlemen.”)
16
Populist poet John Clare (1793-1864) often wrote of the joys of the countryside and its importance to the
common man. See, e.g., John Clare, “The Flitting,” in Poems, Vol. II, at 252 (quoted below at n. __).
17
Although Hardy may be more well-known for his novels, he was also a celebrated poet. Many of his
poems reflect a love for nature and the joys of walking in the countryside. For example:
I went by footpath and by stile
Beyond where bustle ends,
Strayed here a mile and there a mile
And called upon some friends.
Thomas Hardy, “Paying Calls,” lines 1-4, in MOMENTS OF VISION AND MISCELLANEOUS VERSES (1919).
18

See, e.g., William Wordsworth, “Lines Composed a Few Miles Above Tintern Abbey,” (1798)
(discussed below at n. ____).
19
See, e.g., Jane Austen, PRIDE AND PREJUDICE, Ch. VII, discussed below at n.___; MANSFIELD PARK, at 87
(T. Tanner ed. 1985) (lamenting landowner’s destruction of trees).
20
Rambers Association website, www.ramblers.org.uk (claiming 140,000 members).
21
As discussed below, Section II.B, enclosure of common lands occurred gradually over several centuries,
but the most intensive period occurred between 1700 and 1840.
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The loss of these “roaming” rights seems to have been chafing at Britons ever
since. Public discontent with lack of access resulted in celebrated protests, to which
Parliament responded with a gradual shift back to greater access. Rather than a radical
nationalization of private property rights, then, CRoW can be viewed as an attempt to
regain a balance between public and private rights to land that was upset during the
enclosure period.
For Americans, the study of Britain’s right to roam reminds us that there is an
important cost to the recognition of an absolute right to exclude. Rather than simply
accept the right to exclude as a given, courts should carefully consider the interests it
serves and determine whether, in some circumstances, it may be possible to
accommodate greater public access without damaging those interests. The analysis
below suggests that the dramatic difference in treatment of the right to exclude can be
traced to important distinctions in the two countries’ history and culture. Nevertheless,
the new right to roam deserves to be recognized as a landmark, which validates important
public interests that have been all but forgotten in the United States. Americans may be
able to find ways to accommodate those interests in ways that take into account
differences in our cultural and legal landscape.
This article will discuss the evolution of the right to roam in Britain, tracing its
origins to the rights of common held before enclosure. Section II describes how the loss
of roaming rights led the public first to the courts, where they gained limited access
through common law doctrines such as custom and prescription. Still shut out of desired
areas, roamers turned to Parliament, which responded with laws that protected the scenic
beauty of the countryside and, by degrees, increased the public’s access to it. In Section

7

III, the article discusses in detail the most recent, and certainly the most dramatic,
legislative recognition of the public’s right to roam the countryside, CRoW. In addition
to a discussion of the mechanics of the legislation and developments in its early
application, the section will outline the public values behind the right to roam. Finally,
Section IV will compare CRoW to the fierce protection of the right to exclude in the
United States and how we provide access to the countryside. The article concludes that,
despite significant differences in culture and history, the United States may find ways to
better accommodate the important interests behind the right to roam.
II. Evolution of Public Access Rights in Britain
The new “right to roam” established by CRoW can be fully understood only in the
context of Britain’s complex history of public access rights. Before the enclosure period,
British commoners enjoyed a variety of rights to use common land, which were
extinguished when the land was converted to private land. Although many footpath
easements were preserved by enclosure orders, the general right to roam freely over the
mountains and moors was not. The public, however, continued to fight to restore those
roaming rights, first through the courts, with limited success, and then through
Parliament. This section traces the loss of roaming rights and their gradual reinstatement.
The section begins, however, with an examination of the footpath system, another means
of public access with a basis in history.
A. The British Footpath System
Green lanes that shut out burning skies
And old crook’d stiles to rest upon;
Above them hangs the maple tree,
Below grass swells a velvet hill,
And little footpaths sweet to see
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Go seeking sweeter places still.22
This article will discuss two types of public access rights in Britain: footpaths and
roaming rights. Footpaths are public easements over private land that are confined to a
particular defined right of way. A right to roam, in contrast, is not limited to a specific
path. Instead, the right to roam gives much broader access, allowing the public to wander
freely over private meadows or other uncultivated private lands. Under a right to roam, a
family could pick a spot on top of an escarpment or mountaintop and spread out a blanket
for a picnic lunch, while the footpath easement is for travel only. Footpath easements are
typically of ancient origin, while roaming rights were only recently granted in CRoW.
As discussed below, however, both these public rights have historical origins.
“Footpath” is the common term used to describe a “public way,” which actually
encompasses bridleways and carriageways in addition to walking paths. A footpath, the
narrowest of the three types of public ways, is limited to foot-traffic only.23 A bridle-way
may be used for traveling either by foot or by horse, and a carriage-way or by-way may
be used also by motorized vehicles, although it may not be maintained as a road.24 This
article will use the term “footpath” to refer generically to these public easements.
Over 130,000 miles of footpaths crisscross England and Wales25 and on average
each square mile of land contains 2.2 miles of public paths.26 These trails, worn by
countless travelers through the centuries, were historically the primary routes of
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John Clare, “The Flitting,” in POEMS, VOL. II, at 252 (quoted in Kim Taplin, THE ENGLISH PATH, at 8
(1979)).
23

Sir Robert Hunter, THE PRESERVATION OF OPEN SPACES AND OF FOOTPATHS AND OTHER RIGHTS OF
WAY, at 314 (2d ed. 1902). Even bicycles are typically not allowed on a footpath. Id.
24
Id., at 313-14.
25
“Ramblers Protest the ‘National Disgrace’ of Britain’s Footpaths,” The Independent (Apr. 9, 2000),
available on-line at http://www.millennium-debate.org/indsun9ap4.htm.
26
Shoard, supra n. __, at 17.
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communication between villages.27 Before automobiles were invented, of course,
everyone except the gentry had to journey by foot or horseback on these trails, which
certainly pre-date the roads built to accommodate vehicular traffic. Footpaths led to the
mills, to the churches, to the springs, to the lakes or coast, anywhere that people wanted
or needed to go.28 On market days, villagers from all of the surrounding hamlets, laden
with goods to sell, used footpaths to reach the market town.29
Remarkably, many of these paths formed by centuries of use remain in existence
today. Some footpaths span long distances, taking the walker through the pages of
history. For example, the Cotswold Way, a 100-mile trek from the ancient Roman city of
Bath to the historic market town of Chipping Campden, travels along the edge of an
escarpment, offering dramatic views of sheep grazing in fields lined by stone walls in the
valley below.30 The path links picturesque villages, filled with buildings of yellow
Cotswold stone. A day’s walk may take you through the ruins of an ancient Abbey,31
past a castle frequented by Queen Katharine Parr and King Henry VIII,32 and then to a
burial chamber or “long barrow” dating from the Stone Age.33
Hadrian’s Wall Path runs along the entire eighty-mile site of the ancient stone
wall built on the order of Emperor Hadrian in AD 122 to repel Barbarian invasion. The
Thames Path stretches 184 miles along the well-known river, from the middle of London
to the quiet Cotswold countryside. Several coastal paths run hundreds of miles along
27

See Taplin, supra n. __, at 1 (paths important for communication, but also for providing “mental
landscapes”).
28
Taplin, supra n. __, at 3.
29
William Howitt, THE RURAL LIFE OF ENGLAND, pt. II, Ch. 1 (1838), cited in Taplin, supra n. __, at 4748.
30
See Countryside Agency, National Trails website, at www.nationaltrail.co.uk.
31
The ruins of Hailes Abbey, founded in 1246, are located on the Cotswold Way near Winchcombe. Id.
32
Sudeley Castle, on the Cotswold Way near Winchcombe. See www.sudeleycastle.co.uk.
33
Belas Knap, which dates from 3000 B.C, is also near Winchcombe. See
http://britannia.com/wonder/belas.html
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cliffs and through fishing villages. In Wales, Glyndwr’s Way runs 132 miles through a
spectacular variety of terrain, from wild hill country to river valleys, moors and
woodlands.34
Of course, there are many miles of footpaths that are not as renowned or
spectacular, but equally as useful in allowing the rural residents to walk to town, to the
grocery store or the pub, or conversely to allow the town dweller to walk the dog (or
themselves) in the fresh air and sunshine without worrying about traffic. During my
recent stay at a country cottage in Britain, three footpaths passed within 100 yards of the
front door, allowing me to walk to several neighboring villages.
The signal characteristic of these footpaths, and what sets them apart from most
trails in the United States, is that they are almost entirely on private lands. A walker may
climb a stile over a fence, or walk through a kissing gate,35 and follow a path right
through a farmer’s rye field or through a meadow full of grazing sheep. Under British
law, the landowner is prohibited from interfering with this right of way or discouraging
public use of it. Even posting a sign such as “Beware of the Bull” can be deemed an
impermissible means of discouraging foot traffic. If an owner wishes to divert the path,
to build a new structure or for farming reasons, for example, the landowner must obtain a
diversion order. The diversion will be approved only if another pathway is provided that
is not “substantially less convenient” for the public.36

34

For general information on the walking paths of Britain, see www.visitbritain.com/walking or the
website of the Ramblers Association, www.rambler.org.uk.
35

A “kissing gate” is a gate that swings in an enclosure, so that only one person can go through at a time
and animals cannot escape. It is apparently so named because the first person through the gate can demand
a kiss to swing the gate back to let the next person through. Who knew hiking could be so much fun?
36
Section 119(6), Highways Act 1980 (must also consider the effect on public enjoyment of the path).
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A recent case illustrates how seriously the British take their footpaths.37 A golf
course developer started to build a clubhouse directly over a footpath, without having
obtained a diversion order. The local council confirmed the public’s right to use the path
and the developer was forced to provide hardhats to the citizens as they continued to
tramp right through the construction site. The conflict was resolved after the developer
applied for a diversion and had the path moved to another location. In another case,
Andrew Lloyd Webber attempted to divert a footpath that ran between his house and
office, but the inspector rejected the application because he felt that the diversion would
disadvantage the public, by lengthening the path and lessening its visual amenities, which
he thought outweighed Sir Andrew’s concerns.38
The roots of these access rights can be traced to the medieval feudal system.
While the lord of the manor retained ownership of village lands, the villagers enjoyed
complex and varied rights to use common land.39 Rights to the commons included the
right to graze a certain number of animals, to take wood from the forests for heat or for
house repairs, or to take rock or gravel.40 And certainly, commoners could walk or ride
freely over the common or wastelands of the lord; frequently used routes developed into
footpaths and bridleways.41
When the land was later enclosed and common rights largely extinguished, many
footpath rights of way survived, either by the enclosure order itself, or under the doctrines

37

Shirley Skeel, “Rambling and Roaming Rights in England: Walkers Rush to Meet Mapping Deadlines,”
19 CALIFORNIA COAST AND OCEAN (2003), avail. at
http://www.coastalconservancy.ca.gov/coast&ocean/spring2003/pages/three.htm.
38
Shoard, supra n. __, at 197.
39
G.M. Trevelyan, ENGLISH SOCIAL HISTORY, at 35-37 (1944)
40
Id. See also Sir Robert Hunter, THE PRESERVATION OF OPEN SPACES AND OF FOOTPATHS AND OTHER
RIGHTS OF WAY (2d ed. 1902).
41
Some footpaths date back to Roman times, at least. See Anthony Burton, HADRIAN’S WALL PATH:
NATIONAL TRAIL GUIDE (2003)(noting Roman milestone on the footpath to Vindolanda).
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of dedication or prescription. The lord, having allowed the public passage over the land
since time immemorial, was presumed to have dedicated the path to the public or to have
lost the right to object due to the passage of time.42 These doctrines, of course, require
proof that a specific, defined right of way was so used; neither the courts or the enclosure
orders granted a more generic right to roam. The next section more fully describes the
effects of this enclosure period on public access.

B. Impact of Enclosure on Access Rights
The fault is great in man or woman
Who steals a goose from off a common;
But what can plead that man’s excuse
Who steals a common from a goose?43

The enclosure of the commons, which extinguished common rights as it converted
land into private property, completely transformed British society. Enclosure took place
over four centuries, with the most activity occurring between 1700 and the mid-1800s.44
Parliament enacted the first enclosure act in either 1545 or 1606, but most enclosure was
by agreement of the parties until the 1700s.45 In the early eighteenth century,
parliamentary enclosure picked up steam: Parliament passed 280 acts enclosing particular
areas between 1700 and 1760, and passed nearly 4,000 such acts between 1760 and

42

Hunter, supra n. ___, at 316 (citing Poole v. Huskinson, 11 M. & W. 830 (1843) and Eyre v. The New
Forest Highway Board, 56 J.P. 517 (1892)).
43
The Tickler Magazine (Feb. 1, 1821), quoted in THE OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS DICTIONARY OF
QUOTATIONS, at 10 (2d ed. 1953).
44
J.M. Neeson, COMMONERS: COMMON RIGHT, ENCLOSURE AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN ENGLAND, 1700-1820
(1993), at 5 (I used the paperback edition, 1996).
45
Frank A. Sharman, An Introduction to the Enclosure Acts, 10 J. LEG. HIST. 45, 47 (1989).
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1840.46 This latter stage of parliamentary enclosure has provoked the most inquiry into
the fairness of its impact on commoners.47
Typically, Parliament justified enclosure by an appeal to the national interest.
The commons system, according to those favoring enclosure, had resulted in an untenable
situation, including such problems as “the insubordination of commoners, the
unimprovability of their pastures, and the brake on production represented by shared
property.”48 Historians generally agree that enclosure brought more land into production
and improved the economy overall by increasing economies of scale and reducing the
inefficiency caused by multiple tenants.49 However, enclosure came at a heavy price to
the commoners.
Common rights were a complex system of land utilization. Villagers who owned
common rights in the arable fields also might be entitled to graze a certain number of
animals on the common pasture.50 Certain cottages might also have the right to pasture
attached to their occupancy. But even landless commoners could enjoy the use of the
manor’s wasteland.51 For example, they could take fuel, including not only wood, in
46

Sharman, supra n. __, at 48. In addition to parliamentary enclosure, land was also enclosed by private
agreement, which makes study of the subject even more complicated. See Gregory Clark and Anthony
Clark, “Common Right in Land in England, 1475-1839,” 61 J. OF ECON. HIST. 1009 (2001) (attempting to
estimate amount of common land based on statistical study, discussing complexity of enclosure).
47
Maria gren, “Asserting One’s Rights: Swedish Property Law in the Transition From Community Law
to State Law,” 19 L.& HIST. L. REV. 241, 243 n.8 (2001)(citing both favorable and unfavorable treatments
of this enclosure period).
48
Neeson, supra n. __, at 7.
49
Ellickson, supra n. __, at 1392. See also George Wingrove Cooke, THE ACTS FOR FACILITATING THE
ENCLOSURE OF COMMONS IN ENGLAND AND WALES WITH A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF RIGHTS OF
COMMONS, at iv (2d ed. 1850)(the right of common is one of the “conditions of tenure which condemn the
land to perpetual sterility” because of its inefficiency)(quoting Paley, PRINCIPLES OF MORAL AND
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, ch. xi, sec. 6 (1785)).
50
Neeson, supra n. __, at 59.
51
The term waste referred to lands that were at best marginally useful for agricultural production or
grazing. Clark and Clark, at 9. The extent of wasteland depended, therefore, on the economic value of the
crop and agricultural methods. As crops became more valuable and techniques for bringing land into
production improved, lands that were previously thought to be waste became more valuable. Bogs or fens
previously held to be waste, for example, were later drained to bring them into production.
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forested areas, but also turf, gorse, bracken, and peat in other areas.52 Commoners
gathered fruit and nuts on wasteland, as well as herbs and roots.53 Landless commoners
could also enjoy the right to turn out their pigs or geese into the fields after harvest in
order to glean the remaining grain.54 Hunting rights, for deer or rabbit, were also
valuable to commoners.
The origins of these commons rights are ancient and somewhat obscure.
Although the lord owned the land according to royal grant or proclamation, necessity
required him to allow the villagers to make use of some of it, especially those lands
which the lord found to be of little economic value – the “waste” lands. As long as land
was more abundant than people, the system worked nicely.
So long as the population was scanty, land was too abundant to be cultivated for
pasture. After as much as the population could till had been parceled out, with a
reservation of services, there was still a large remaining waste, upon which the
cattle used in tillage might pasture. The waste was the lord’s but its extent was
beyond his power of occupation, and the tenants of his arable lands used it until
he chose to reclaim it.55
But the custom arose as much from the public need as it did from the lord’s economic
surplus. The Statute of Merton in 1235 allowed the Lord of the Manor to enclose his
waste, to some extent, but required him to leave enough of the waste “for the needs of his
tenants,” and the right was further burdened by recognition of the commoners’ rights of
pasture.56 While fee title might belong to the lord, the land was burdened by public

52

Neeson, supra n. __, at 159. Wood could also be taken for building or repairing houses or barns. See
also Fred P. Bosselman, “Limitations Inherent in the Title to Wetlands at Common Law,” 15 STAN. ENV. L.
J. 247, 265-70 (1996) (describing value of commoners’ multitude of uses of English fens and wetlands,
which were destroyed by enclosure).
53
Neeson, supra n. __, at 169-70.
54
Peter King, “Customary Rights and Women’s Earnings: The Importance of Gleaning to the Rural
Labouring Poor 1750-1850,” 44 ECONOMIC HISTORY REVIEW 461, 461 (1991).
55
Cooke, supra n. __, at 4.
56

Hammonds, supra n. __, Ch. 1.
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servitudes said to have their origins in concessions made to the commoners “in remote
antiquity.”57 Thus, commons rights represented a mediation between the needs or
demands of the gentry and those of the lower classes, which enclosure threatened to
upset.
There are countless explanations and analyses of why enclosure occurred. The
economic explanation is simply that land became scarcer and agricultural prices higher.
Until then, the gentry had tolerated common rights because it was not worth the cost to
enclose the lands. As innovations in agricultural practices made farming larger tracts
feasible, the benefits of enclosure began to outweigh the costs.58 Moreover,
consolidating the land ownership into one owner rather than dozens or hundreds of
common rightholders allowed for more efficient decisionmaking.59
Under the parliamentary enclosure system, as it developed, any landowner could
petition Parliament to initiate enclosure.60 Although the petition could be opposed by the
commoners, successful opposition would require the poor to somehow acquire the
wherewithal to oppose powerful landed interests. Few commoners would be able to
afford representation or travel to London to present their complaints against enclosure.61
Even if they did, commoners would have little chance of succeeding against the more
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George Wingrove Cooke, supra n. __, at iv (expense of enclosure formerly not worth the cost). Cooke
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politically powerful gentry.62 Protests did occur, however, including the burning of
fenceposts and rioting.63
Upon the enactment of an enclosure act, Parliament appointed commissioners to
allocate the lands to be enclosed. The commissioners allotted lands to the Lord of the
Manor, to tithe-holders, and to those who owned land in the common fields. In at least
some instances, the allocation set aside land for the use of the poor.64 In the enclosure
orders, the commissioners typically set out roads and footpaths to be recognized over the
enclosed lands.65
However, landless commoners and those with small allotments were profoundly
affected by enclosure and the loss of common rights. Enclosure basically extinguished
the village economy, in which many peasants eked out an existence on common lands
and thereby could remain independent. Those who lost common rights, sometimes half
of the villagers, sometimes more,66 were not compensated adequately, or even at all.67
The right to gather fuel or to turn geese or pigs out into the field for gleaning, for
example, was simply lost overnight. Although some peasants turned to the courts to
vindicate their common rights, those attempts were unsuccessful.68 The poor, in essence,
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63
Neeson, supra n. __, ch. 9, pp. 259 ff. (documenting protests illustrating “deep hostility” toward
enclosure, which was “corrosive of social relations,” id. at 291); Bosselman, at 301 (describing violence
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Sharman, supra n. __, at 59.
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Neeson, supra n. __, at 61, 72-73.
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2d ed. 1966); Bosselman, supra n. __, at 301 (statutes authorizing drainage and enclosure of fens “made
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became poorer, “surrounded by hether (sic) they dare not collect, and by a profusion of
turnips they dare not pluck.”69 Even those allotted small landholdings in the enclosure
found it difficult to continue, because of the cost of enclosure and the loss of common
rights that supported their small operations.70
Virtually overnight, peasants who had been able to earn a living independently
became desperate for a wage-earning job. The new supply of laborers became the fodder
to fuel the Industrial Revolution. Even the simple loss of gleaning rights, which allowed
a peasant’s pigs and ducks to fatten in the fallen grain after harvest, could force a
commoner from the land and into the labor force. 71
The loss of independence caused by the shift to a labor economy was decried by
many who were now “utterly dependent on miserable wages.”72 In the words of poet
John Clare, enclosure “came and trampled on the grave, of labour’s rights and left the
poor a slave.”73 Just as Thomas Jefferson believed that liberty depended on a nation of
independent landowners, British commentators have noted that the independence of the
commoner, “the most precious gift of a free nation,” was one of most important casualties
of enclosure.74
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In addition, the loss of common rights had a larger social impact. Many elderly
villagers had been effectively supported by the young who worked and shared the wealth
of common fields and pastures; with enclosure, the elderly were now left to fend for
themselves.75 The poor, who had been able to survive on the common rights, were now
forced to try to find scarce work, and relations between the classes became strained and
tainted with resentment.76 Owning a common right gave all of the villagers a connection
to the land and to each other that was lost with enclosure. The system of communal
property may have been inefficient, and its demise may have been inevitable, but we
should not overlook the social side of the equation. Communal property often created a
community fabric made up of social relationships that contributed to well-being in ways
that do not show up on the balance sheets.77
Moreover, even if enclosure was more efficient, scholars roundly condemn its
fairness. Enclosure appears to have been a legislatively sanctioned reallocation of
property rights from commoners to the landed gentry.78 More succinctly, E.P.
Thompson called it “class robbery.”79 Prior to enclosure, the poor had come to depend
on common rights, taking them “to be as much their property, as a rich man’s land is his
own.”80 Enclosure extinguished those rights, for the most part without compensation.
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In praising enclosure as a prime example of the economic efficiency of private
property as opposed to the common pool, some modern scholars seem to have glossed
over the redistributive impacts of the allocation. In his seminal article, “Property in
Land,” for example, Professor Ellickson notes: “It is now widely agreed, however, that, at
least after 1700, enclosures in England were usually scrupulously fair to smallholders,
who received new lands in rough proportion to the value of their prior rights.” 81 For this
supposed wide agreement, Ellickson cites only Sharman, who actually concludes after a
brief review that “it is not at present possible to pass judgment” on the fairness of
parliamentary enclosure.82 In his one-page analysis of the “general effects” of enclosure,
Sharman notes the dramatic impact on the poor, who got “little or nothing” out of
enclosure and on small landowners, whose allotments were so small as to be
commercially impracticable to farm.83 Ellickson does concede that laborers lost out in
enclosure, because they received no allotments and lost their common rights, but
concludes that “most villages appear to have regarded the last waves of enclosures as
welcome reprieves from archaic land tenure arrangements.”84 This analysis of enclosure
thus appears to be skewed to minimize enclosure’s costs, perhaps to more fully support a
theory that favors private ownership over communal ownership of property.
Although one can certainly argue that consolidation of land ownership was more
economically efficient, the unfairness of this property redistribution cannot be so easily
81
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swept under the rug. In fact, although historians may debate the impact enclosure
caused,85 the consensus is closer to the view of Christopher Hill, who states that
“enclosure brought untold suffering to countless numbers of English men, women and
children.”86 Stuart Banner notes that enclosure favored the politically powerful, while the
poorest commoners often got nothing.87 Neeson’s recent careful analysis of peasant life
and the effects of enclosure concludes that enclosure destroyed a whole class—the
English peasantry – and along with it the “social cement” that bound the village
together.88
The reallocation of property rights that occurred during enclosure is one of the
great case studies of what property rights truly are and how they arise. For centuries, the
public had enjoyed rights of common on the lands of the lord. Then, suddenly, those
rights were extinguished. In some cases, some compensation was given to those who lost
common rights, but the paltry sums offered could not begin to make up for the rights
upon which many commoners desperately depended.
Banner calls enclosure an example of a transition from a “functional” system, in
which various people have rights to do things on a particular piece of ground, to a
“spatial” system of absolute ownership of certain territory.89 The recognition of a public
right to roam then, represents a return to a more functional approach, in which the
landowner’s rights exist alongside the public’s use of the land for wandering. While
Britain will never return to common fields and gleaning rights, granting the public greater
85
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rights of access to private property must be viewed against the backdrop of this history.
Thus, CRoW may be seen as simply a step toward restoring to the public what it lost
during enclosure.
C. Limited Common Law Rights of Access
The first attempts to regain common rights of access came through the common
law. After enclosure, commoners increasingly asked courts to recognize as legitimate
their use of enclosed lands. With regard to public access, the common law favored the
continued right to use footpaths, under certain circumstances, but failed to recognize a
more general right to roam.
Enclosure obviously threatened to extinguish not only common rights, but also the
paths used by commoners to reach the village or other towns. Sometimes the special
commissioners appointed under an enclosure act would explicitly include a public right
of way in their award.90 In many cases, however, public use of the footpath simply
continued until challenged by the landowner, and the case was then decided in court.91
In that case, courts would apply the common law doctrine of prescription, for
private easements, or implied dedication, for public uses, to determine whether the right
of way would be granted. These doctrines required proof that the path had been used
from "time immemorial;” if so, under the fiction of the “lost grant,” the right of way
could not be extinguished.92 Originally, the period of adverse use had to date from the
reign of a particular monarch. Under the Statute of Merton (1235), for example, the date

90

Hunter, supra n. __, at 317.

91

Id., at 317-18.

92

Fitzpatrick v. Robinson, 9 G.IV. 585 (1828); Bryant v. Foot, L.R. 2 Q.B. 161, 181 (1867).

22

was the accession of Henry II (1154), later advanced to the accession of Richard I in
1189 by the Statute of Westminster (1275). The Limitation Act 1623 fixed a twentyyear period of limitation for actions for ejectment and thereafter judges began using that
period by analogy as raising a presumption of enjoyment since 1189.93 Under the 1832
Prescription Act, Parliament statutorily confirmed the 20-year period for private
easements by prescription.94 The Rights of Way Act 1932 prescribed the identical period
for public easements by implied dedication.95
Commoners sought to maintain many other public uses of the commons, aside
from footpaths, including use of the village greens for recreation.96 Again, courts would
uphold the villagers’ claims if well-established by custom, which was basically a variant
of the theories behind dedication or prescription.97 The public uses upheld ranged from
dancing,98 to horseracing,99 to playing cricket.100 Eventually, this doctrine of custom was
incorporated into a statute seeking to settle these claims by registering public spaces as
village greens.101
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The public uses upheld by custom, prescription, or dedication, however, did not
extend to a public right to roam.102 In one seminal case, Blundell v. Catterall,103 the court
declined to allow a general common law right of public access to seashores over private
lands. The defendant was an employee of a hotel in Great Crosby, a village on the River
Mersey (an arm of the Irish Sea), who earned money by taking hotel guests down to the
water in bathing machines.104 The Lord of the Manor, over whose lands the defendant
had to pass, objected to this practice and sued for trespass. The hotel employee did not
rely on prescription or custom, because although citizens had crossed the land for many
years on foot, crossing with bathing machines was a relatively recent practice. The court
held that it could not grant a general common law right of public access, apart from
custom and prescription, and it refused to engage in a balancing approach to access
rights:
[P]ublic convenience must in all cases be viewed with due regard to private
property, the preservation of which is one of the distinguishing characteristics of
the law of England. It is true that property of this description is in general of little
value to its owner. But if such a general right as is claimed should be established,
it is hard to know how that little is to be protected, much less increased. . . . Many
of those persons who reside in the vicinity of wastes and commons walk or ride
on horseback in all directions over them for their health and recreations. . . .yet no
one ever thought that any right existed in favour of the enjoyment, or that any
justification could be pleaded to an action at the suit of the owner of the soil.”105
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Thus, the court found that establishing a right to public access, very similar to that
granted by CRoW some 180 years later, would be “inconsistent with the nature of
permanent private property.”106
In dissent, Justice Best would have found a common law right, noting that “free
access to the sea is a privilege too important to Englishmen to be left dependant on the
interest or caprice of any description of persons.”107 Justice Best noted the public
benefits associated with bathing (health, primarily, but also learning to swim), which use
of a bathing machine furthered.108 More generally, he emphasized the public interest in
navigation, which free passage to the seashore promoted. Best believed that the common
law had to adapt to further the public’s current needs: “As law is a just rule fitted to the
existing state of things, it must alter as the state of things to which it relates alters.”109
Thus, for Justice Best, the proper distribution of property rights between the
private and public owners was not a formalistic exercise, but rather a balance struck by
weighing social policy concerns.110 Even though some members of the majority also
discussed the balance of interests, they struck the balance differently. Those justices
placed far greater weight on the interests of the private owner, believing that granting a
general common law right of access would render private property meaningless.
Conversely, the public side of the balance carried less weight as those members believed
that, in general, the public had sufficient access to beaches through either customary or
prescriptive rights, or through the permissive use of private owners. Where there was
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clearly no harm to the private owner, Chief Justice Abbott pointed out, the landowner is
unlikely to object to public access or to bother bringing the claim to court.111
Similarly, courts disfavored the claim of a common right to roam, or servitus
spatiandi.112 For example, courts emphasized that rights cannot be established by custom
that would extend to the public in general; instead, a customary right must be limited to a
particular and limited class of persons.113 In addition, courts feared that property owners
“would virtually be divested of all open and unenclosed lands over which people have
been allowed to wander and ramble as they pleased.”114 Because the owner, before
enclosure, had very little opportunity or economic incentive to prevent the use of
wastelands for roaming, the courts found no abandonment or implied dedication.115 In
some cases, even though the public's use could be established, courts presumed that the
use was permissive and thus no intent to dedicate could be implied.116 In weighing the
interests of the public versus the burden on the landowner, courts also disfavored uses
classified as mere “pleasure” rather than those necessary for “health.”117
In deciding these custom cases, the English courts seemed to be struggling to
strike the appropriate balance between public and private rights. One dividing line was
that the custom must be “necessary.” Fishermen, for example, could properly claim the
right to pitch their stakes on another’s land in order to dry their nets, if it were deemed to
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be necessary to do so.118 This appears to be a rough attempt to determine the case on
economic efficiency grounds – whether the public benefit outweighs the harm to the
individual landowner, recognizing that transaction costs would likely prevent the parties
from reaching the optimal result on their own.
But the courts also wanted to limit public rights claimed by custom to only a
specific group of beneficiaries. In Fitch v. Rawling,119 the defendants were charged with
trespass for playing cricket on plaintiff’s lands. Although the court was quite willing to
support the customary right of the local inhabitants to play sports on the property, it drew
the line at allowing outsiders to join in. Justice Buller declared: “Customs must in their
nature be confined to individuals of a particular description, and what is common to all
mankind, can never be claimed as a custom.”120 The court does not, however, give any
reason for this limitation.
In Cox v. Glue,121 perhaps aptly named for a case involving horse-racing, the
court again attempted to strike a balance. In an action for trespass, the court had no
problem upholding the customary right of the local citizenry to hold horse-races on the
ground on the manor of Derby.122 The fee-owner, by custom, did not have the right to
possess the soil from July 6 to February 14, when the citizens enjoyed a common right of
pasturage, and therefore the landowner could not complain about horse-back riding.123
However, the fee owner also complained that defendants had erected tents, stalls, and
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booths, and had thereby made holes in the soil by sinking stakes and posts.124 Stressing
the limitations on customary rights, the court found that the custom did not extend to
disturbance of the soil and therefore the trespass action would lie.125
Again, the court made a technical distinction – preventing the citizens from
“trespassing” on the soil by sinking a stake in the ground – in order to place some limits
on public rights over private property. The court could have distinguished between the
types of uses of the soil that had been established by custom – i.e., grazing horses is fine,
but racing them is not. Presumably, however, the court did not want to become
enmeshed in numerous cases alleging that a horse was ridden rather than grazed and so
drew the line at a place much easier to police. In addition, an activity that disturbs the
soil may be more likely to hurt the fee owner than surface activities, so economic
efficiency also comes into play.
Thus, while the public was able to protect or regain some of their historic uses
through common law doctrines of prescription, implied dedication, and custom, courts
placed limits on those remedies to prevent their widespread use. In many cases, courts
used a sort of economic balancing test to determine the extent to which they would honor
the historic uses of common land. In the end, the right to roam the countryside was not
recognized as important enough to justify a common law right and lands that for centuries
had been open to the public for wandering were shut off by the landowner, with no
recourse. Instead of gradually dissipating, however, public dismay at the loss of
countryside access fermented. Increasingly, citizens turned to Parliament to provide the
remedy.
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D. Facilitating Access Through Statutory Reform
The public’s interest in countryside is focused on two major policy areas:
preservation and access. Obviously, both are equally important. Unless the beauty of
rural Britain is preserved, access will become meaningless. Likewise, unless the public
can enjoy the countryside, expensive measures to preserve its scenery have little value,
rather like hiding a Monet in the basement.126 This section describes the measures
Britain has employed to preserve its countryside and then details the attempts to grant
access leading up to CRoW at the turn of the century.

1. Land Use Controls to Preserve Scenic Values
The British have always had a deep commitment to the countryside. While many
Americans find bucolic scenes pleasant, Britain’s reverence for its rural scenery rises to a
much higher level. When Britons use the term “countryside,” they refer to a category of
land worthy of special protection. For example, the Department of the Environment calls
the countryside “a national asset,” which is a “priceless part of our national heritage.”127
The British Parliament created a special government body, Natural England, for the
precise purpose of promoting and conserving the quality of rural life and the countryside
itself, for the enjoyment of all.128 While Americans may lament the loss of the family
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farm and attack urban sprawl, we have no similar national commitment to the countryside
in general.
Because most of the land in Britain’s scenic countryside is privately owned, the
burden of maintaining its beauty falls mainly on individual landowners. About 80% of
British property is owned privately;129 in the United States, however, only around 60%
of land is in private hands.130 Thus, while Americans create public spaces, such as
national parks, on government land, Britain is more likely to use a variety of regulatory
tools that leave the land in private hands, but significantly restrict development activity.
Britain, in fact, did not create its first national park -- the Peak District -- until
1951,131 long after the United States had established its first national park, Yellowstone,
in 1872.132 But the British concept of a national park differs significantly from the
American model, in that the British park is not wholly “natural” in the sense of being
insulated from human development activity. Although some areas are strictly protected
as nature preserves, in most parks mining, timber cutting, farming, and grazing can be
found, alongside tourist and residential development.133 None of the public lands in
Britain probably could be classified as “wilderness” under the American conception.134
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Thus, the British definition of “natural beauty” does not refer, typically, to areas
untouched by human hands. Instead, the countryside revered in Britain is the product of
human interaction with nature for centuries. Whatever may have been its condition
before man arrived, “nature” in Britain now often connotes meadows of grazing sheep or
fields of flax, hedgerows, stone walls and old barns. Indeed, government authorities
recognize that much of the countryside’s attraction is the result of these rural
development features, so their efforts are aimed as much at preserving stone walls and
hedgerows as they are at nature itself.135
British law contains a variety of tools that protect the beauty of the countryside.
These regulations strictly control development in the countryside for no other reason than
to promote aesthetic or cultural values. Because British law regarding land development
is much more restrictive than American law, it provides an interesting comparison of how
societies balance private and public interests in property.
In many respects, the process governing land development in England has much
in common with the U.S. system.136 Both control mechanisms are concerned primarily
with the separation of incompatible uses,137 and secondarily with creating efficient and
aesthetically pleasing urban plans.138 Both proceed from a central land use plan. In the
U.S., most cities and many counties have a comprehensive land use plan, which is then
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implemented through zoning, subdivision, and other regulations. In England, the
planning process results in a district local plan that combines many of these aspects.
The differences in the two systems, however, have important consequences. First,
while the American system allows local governments to exercise primary planning
authority, the British system's control mechanism gives more authority over development
to regional and national bodies. The Secretary of State of the Environment retains
centralized control over all policy relating to planning.139 The degree of central control is
quite remarkable from the American perspective, where there is usually little federal or
even state level interference with local land use decisions, except where particular
environmental laws such as the Endangered Species Act or wetlands restrictions are
implicated.140 In England, however, the Department of the Environment (DOE) issues
detailed policies concerning land use planning, which require specific planning decisions
in specific circumstances. For example, national policy requires planners at the district
level to strictly control development in the countryside.141 Moreover, the central
government can become directly involved in individual land use decisions: the DOE may
"call in" any application for planning permission for decision in the first instance at the
national level142 and landowners may appeal to the DOE the local authority's refusal to
grant planning permission.143 British courts have upheld this strong central government
role.144
As a result, there is less chance that a “race to the bottom” will develop, in which
competitive forces overwhelm local attempts to control development. While local
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officials may feel pressure to waive a restriction to promote the economic development of
an area, regional and national officials would be more focused on broader interests,
including preserving aesthetics. In addition, using regional rather than local control over
the planning process allows the government authority to take into account the relationship
among various towns and the rural areas in between.145 The planners focus on retaining
the integrity of individual communities and specifically guard against one community to
become a suburb of another. For example, the plan for old market town of Chipping
Campden in the Cotswolds quite specifically prohibits further development along the
road which leads to the small hamlet of Broad Campden, only 200 meters away, "[t]o
prevent the character of [Broad Campden] being swamped by its much larger
neighbour."146
Second, most American towns exercise very little control over the specific nature
and design of development, as long as it is within the broad parameters of the applicable
zoning classification and meets the subdivision requirements. In contrast, the English
planning process becomes heavily involved in the specifics of the proposed use. For
example, in Chipping Campden, the Cotswold District Council refused planning
permission for a housing development because the nature and number of planned
dwellings would be "detrimental to the character and appearance” of the area and would
have an adverse effect on "views into and from the surrounding countryside and town."147
The Council determined that the proposal's impact on the landscape would be contrary to
policies contained in the county Structure Plan and the Cotswold District Local Plan
specifically protecting landscape in Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty.148 The plan
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was also rejected because of its "suburban-style layout and house designs, with large
houses in comparatively small gardens."149 The Council noted that the uniform design of
the houses would be out of character for the area, which contained "individually-designed
properties set in large gardens."150 While this development faced greater controls
because it was in an Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty,151 in many instances British
planning delve far deeper than American authorities do into the design of the
development.
Finally, when planning permission is refused, compensation is rarely awarded in
England. Although the contrast can be overdrawn, it can be said that the British
landowner has no legitimate expectation of development absent planning permission,
while in the U.S. there is a legitimate expectation of development absent a pre-existing
regulation prohibiting it. As described below, significant controls on development have
long been a part of British landowners’ expectations.
Although town planning first became part of British law in 1909, Parliament
attacked the problem comprehensively in 1947, pushed by the need to rebuild the areas
destroyed in World War II in an orderly fashion.152 The 1947 Act established complete
government control over the development of land, by absolutely prohibiting any kind of
development without planning permission.153 The most remarkable aspect of the 1947
Act, however, was its nationalization of development rights. Sir Desmond Heap called
the Act "the most drastic and far-reaching provision[] ever enacted affecting the
ownership of land . . . and the liberty of an owner to develop and use his own land as he
149
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thinks fit."154 Landowners would henceforth have no right to change the existing use of
land and, in return for this expropriation of development value, could make a claim on a
£300 million fund.155 Thereafter, because the government would now own the
development rights, landowners would be required to pay development charges for the
benefits conferred when the government granted development permission.156
The plan to nationalize land development rights, however, did not succeed. The
1954 Town and Country Planning Act eliminated the development levy and allowed
development fund claims only when the landowner had been subjected to planning
restrictions that limited or prevented the development of land.157 Even though
development value had not been expropriated, however, the general rule that no
compensation would be granted for refusing planning permission for new development
remained.158 Compensation would be granted only where permission was withdrawn
after it had already been granted or where retroactive controls on existing development
destroyed its value – a vested rights approach.159 The 1949 Act also included a concept
of “planning gain,” requiring developers who realize an increase in property value when
consent to develop is granted to share some of that benefit with the community.160
Although the concept of planning gain was eventually abandoned as unworkable, vestiges
of the notion that developers owe something to the community may be found in the idea
of greater access rights.
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In 1990, Parliament enacted a new Town and Country Planning Act, along with
several other planning acts relating to listed buildings, conservation areas and hazardous
substances.161 These British laws, which are now the main planning controls, place
significant restrictions on development that would damage the scenic landscape,
illustrating the value the public places on aesthetics.162 In general, local authorities have
broad authority to deny “planning permission,” roughly equivalent to a plat approval in
the American scheme, if the proposed development would harm local interests, including
preserving the area’s scenery.163 Furthermore, at the national level, restrictions include
stringent measures to protect historic buildings, wildlife, and the countryside.164
The development boundary is another feature of British planning law that
significantly protects countryside values.165 Within the development boundary,
development "is acceptable in principle."166 This hardly means that development is a
foregone conclusion. The development must be "of an appropriate scale, in sympathy
with the form and character of the settlement and the surroundings of the site," and it
must not have a "significant adverse impact on the environment."167 This of course
means that the development must be carefully tailored to the site, and the district council
will look closely at the design and size of the development to ensure that it does not
unduly impact its neighbors or the town in general.168
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Outside the development boundary, only strictly limited forms of development are
allowed.169 For example, a farmer would not be allowed to build a new house on his or
her land unless there is a proven need for the dwelling.170 Many developers have tried to
get around the development restrictions by converting existing agricultural structures,
such as barns, into houses or apartments. The policy also strictly controls this practice,
allowing such conversions if they positively contribute to the local rural economy or
relieve other development pressures, for example.171
Zoning maps may also contain "Policy Areas" that are subject to very specific
controls, many of which are calculated to preserve aesthetic values. In the scenic
Cotswolds, for example, the map for the ancient market town of Chipping Campden
contains Policy Area D, called "The Craves", which prohibits any development that
would "adversely affect the open character, general appearance, or setting afforded to the
surrounding areas or buildings."172 In Policy Area L, an area in the center of town, new
development is "very unlikely to be permitted."173 Thus, local plans may incorporate
significant restrictions on development likely to impair the community’s interest in
maintaining local character.
Many other types of development controls may be used to preserve the British
countryside for the enjoyment of the public. For example, the Countryside Agency may
169
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designate an “Area of Outstanding Beauty” or a “conservation area,” in which
development can occur only in ways that “preserve or enhance the natural beauty of the
landscape.”174 Similarly, English Nature has the power to designate an area as a Site of
Special Scientific Interest (SSSI), by reason of any of its flora, fauna, geological or
physiographical features.175 Landowners in the SSSI must obtain government consent
for activities that may damage these values and, at least until CRoW, English Nature
typically entered into management agreements that provided compensation in exchange
for preservation.176 CRoW now allows the agency to prohibit damaging activities
without compensation, as discussed below.177 The control of development goes literally
down to the bushes: the Department of the Environment now requires the notification of
local planning authority before hedgerows over 20 meters long are removed. If the
hedgerow is considered important under certain criteria, the local authority can refuse
permission.178

In combination, these development restrictions effectively preserve the scene of
“natural beauty” coveted by British ramblers. Similar controls in the United States, of
course, would quickly run into constitutional takings claims, if the restriction
significantly impacted property values.179 While British laws provide compensation in
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limited circumstances, for the most part Britain seems to reverse the presumption in favor
of development present in American property law.
2. Increasing Recognition of Access Rights
Sooner than part from the mountains, I think I would rather be dead….
I may be a wage slave on Monday, but I am a free man on Sunday.180
- Ewan Maccoll, The Manchester Rambler
While land use laws increasingly focused on preserving the natural beauty of the
countryside, Parliament also slowly moved toward granting the public greater access.
Even as enclosure was foreclosing the public's use of the commons, many recognized that
the growth of cities in the Industrial Revolution actually increased the need for access to
the countryside, “as a recreation-ground for all classes.”181 In essence, the battle over the
loss of a common right to ramble never ended. Even as far back as 1868, commentators
noted a movement to change legislatively the results of court decisions that limited public
access rights, by declaring a public right of exercise and recreation on waste lands
“without paying the value of the private rights of ownership.”182 The establishment of a
Commons Preservation society in the 1870’s also indicates how long the public has been
seeking greater protection for public uses of land.183 In 1884, MP James Bryce
introduced the first bill to establish a public right to roam.184 Although the bill failed, the
movement toward greater access had begun. During the next century, Parliament tipped
the balance toward greater public use slowly; finally, with the enactment of CRoW in
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2000, the right to roam was restored. The impetus for this change thus has deep roots in
British history.
In 1932, a large group of ramblers from Manchester trespassed on private land on
Kinder Scout, a high windswept plateau containing the highest point in the celebrated
Peak District. The trespassers engaged in this civil disobedience to protest their exclusion
from “some of the best countryside England has to offer.”185 Confronted by a group of
the landowner’s gamekeepers, violence ensued and some of the trespassers were arrested.
Public sentiment, however, favored the hikers, and after WWII, the government under
Prime Minister Attlee began a movement toward public rights to the countryside. One of
the first steps was the establishment of national parks, one of which included the Kinder
Scout area.186 Remarkably, just as Americans now revere the protests of Martin Luther
King and Rosa Parks, which brought down the barriers of discrimination, Britons now
praise the Kinder Scout trespassers as having secured "far-reaching changes in unjust and
oppressive law."187
In 1939, Parliament attempted to open the mountains to public use through the
Access to Mountains Act. Instead of declaring mountains to be open for roaming,
however, the Act merely set up an “elaborate machinery” for issuance of an access order
for a particular area.188 The process required an application to be filed with the Minister
of Agriculture, but the applicant had to pay large deposits to cover the costs of the
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process and many applications were rejected. Moreover, any access granted was subject
to numerous restrictions.189
In 1949, Parliament created “immense changes” in the right of public access by
enacting the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act (NPACA).190 Under this
legislation, the system of public rights of way, including footpaths, bridleways, and
carriageways, was comprehensively mapped. Each county council conducted a survey
showing where public rights of way were thought to exist.191 A landowner or the public
could appeal this determination, but would have to produce evidence contradicting the
council’s proposed designation.192 This process resulted in a definitive map, which was
deemed conclusive regarding these easements.193 The map is reviewed periodically to
conform to changes or new information.194 A new right of way may be created, but only
by compensating the owner.195 The Act also provided the national government with
authority to establish long-distance routes.196
The NPACA was important, because it systematically confirmed public rights of
way and established a procedure for administratively determining rights over
controversial paths. If a landowner challenged the existence of a path, both sides could
produce evidence of use or nonuse and the matter could be settled rather quickly and
inexpensively. Thus, the Act created much greater certainty regarding the existence and
location of footpaths, which furthered the public's confidence in using them.
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The NPACA also allowed the government to issue compulsory orders to open up
private land to public roaming.197 However, this attempt to provide roaming rights failed
miserably. In order to issue a compulsory order, the permission of three cabinet ministers
was required, a cumbersome process had to be followed, and compensation paid.198
Moreover, the request for an access order had to come from a county council, many of
which were dominated by landowners or locals reluctant to open the land to outsiders.199
Only two access orders were ever issued under NPACA.200 Thus, the public's desire for
greater countryside access remained unsatisfied.
III. Countryside and Rights of Way Act (CRoW) 2000
Although the extensive network of footpaths, coupled with the establishment of
public lands under NPACA, gave Britons significant opportunities for walking in the
countryside, the public still wanted more. Footpaths were confined to limited routes and
some desirable lands had no public access at all. "Why," asked Marion Shoard, "shouldn't
people be able to go where they wanted to go?"201
Britons also looked jealously at the far greater access rights provided by their
European neighbors.202 For example, in Sweden, Finland and Norway, the public enjoys
"allemansrätten," which allows a general right of access to all land in the countryside,
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although the right stems from custom rather than explicit law. Pursuant to
allemansrätten, the public may walk over any private land, unless if it would conflict with
privacy (near houses or other dwellings) or would interfere with growing crops.203 Far
more than just walking, allemansrätten gives the public the right to picnic or camp, and
even gather mushrooms or berries.204 Other countries, such as Germany, Denmark,
Switzerland, Austria and Spain, also give the public broad access rights to certain types
of private lands,205 and Britons wondered why they could not enjoy them as well.
Public sentiment for roaming rights began to grow in the 1990's. Ramblers' rights
groups conducted mass occupations of countryside areas.206 In 1994, the Labour Party,
then out of power, made the public right of access part of its platform at its annual
conference. So, when Labour ended 18 years of Conservative Party rule in 1997, the
people expected action to be taken.207 The Blair government began in February 1998 by
issuing a consultation paper, to solicit comments on how best to provide access to the
countryside, especially mountain, moor, heath, down and registered common land, which
it estimated was some 1.2 to 1.8 million hectares or around 10% of the land area of
England and Wales.208
Landowners, of course, were understandably wary of the new proposals. They
feared not only a loss of property value due to the imposition of an easement, but also
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increased costs of liability insurance, greater need for supervision of livestock and
increased costs of repair of fences and other damage, and even costs for the provision of
access in the first place by installing stiles or kissing gates. At a minimum, landowner
rights groups believed the government should compensate them for access or allow them
to charge users in order to recoup these costs, which they estimated would be anywhere
from £29 and £37 per hectare annually.209 Local authorities and recreational users
overwhelmingly opposed compensation, however, except perhaps for improvements
necessary to facilitate the initial provision of access.210 Although a few suggested that
roamers should be required to buy an annual pass for access nationally, the vast majority
opposed any fee for access.211
In the end, Parliament was convinced that the public benefit from opening up
access to these lands would far outweigh the additional burden on the landowners.212 The
government estimated that costs to landowners would be minimal, especially on land that
was not used for hunting.213 Damage caused by access users, such as vandalism, erosion,
littering, and stock worrying, was anticipated to be rare.214 For sites that would be
infrequently visited and were not used by landowners for hunting, annual costs to
landowners were thought to be extremely low, estimated to range from £.06 to £.51 per
hectare. At the upper end, however, for popular sites also used for hunting, landowners
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might lose as much as £8.70 per hectare when loss of hunting income was considered.215
The government estimate of benefits to the public, based on a “willingness to pay”
analysis, ranged from £.39/hectare for infrequently used upland sites to £87.50 for
frequently used lowland areas.
In introducing its Right to Roam proposal, the Blair administration set out its case
for this readjustment in rights: “In a crowded island, we are fortunate to have some of the
most beautiful landscapes to be found anywhere in the world. But through England and
Wales, from mountain and moorland to heath, down and ancient common lands, some of
our finest countryside has been closed to public access for centuries.”216 Although the
government considered a largely voluntary access plan with compensation incentives and
a plan that included condemnation of access with landowner payments, both options
entailed much higher implementation costs in the form of implementation and
administration costs.217 Moreover, experience with the voluntary approach under
previous acts increased skepticism in the efficacy of that approach.218 Therefore, the
administration settled on a new statutory right of access to the open countryside, coupled
with restrictions on the right to protect landowner interests.219 While compensation
would not be provided, local authorities could assist with the costs of providing access,
and landowner liability would be limited.220 Thus, the government believed it had struck
the proper balance between interests of the public and the landowners.221
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A. Mechanics of Legislation
In 2000, the British Parliament enacted CRoW, which opened up certain
categories of private property to public access. Under this Act, the public has the right to
wander over registered "common land" and lands classified as “open country,” consisting
of mountain, moorland, heath and downland.222 Lands qualifying for access comprise
about 12% of England and Wales, an estimated 4 million acres in England alone.223
Some of the country’s most scenic real estate were opened up, including areas fought
over by nature lovers and landowners for over a century.224 Vast landholdings that were
previously shut off from the public, including the downs of “Wuthering Heights” fame in
West Yorkshire and the moors of Dartmoor, which is currently occupied by the Price of
Wales, are now accessible.225
The public may freely enter lands classified as common land or open country “for
the purposes of open-air recreation,” provided that they do not damage fences or gates.226
Unlike the footpath easement, wanderers are not restricted to any particular right-of-way
on these lands. The access is primarily for walking and picnicking; one may not hunt,
light a fire, swim in nontidal waters, remove plants or trees, ride a bicycle or horse, or
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disrupt lawful activities on the land.227 Breaches of these restrictions will result in loss of
the right of access for a period of 72 hours.228
CRoW requires the Countryside Agency to prepare a definitive map of all
registered common land and open country.229 The agency issued maps in draft form,
received comments, and then issued the maps in provisional form in 2004.230 The
landowner could then appeal the designation to the Secretary of State, who could appoint
an inspector to investigate and decide the appeal.231 The inspector could hold a hearing
or “local inquiry” with regard to the case.232

The only ground for appeal with respect to

open country designation was that the land did not in fact consist “wholly or
predominately of mountain, moor, heath or down.”233 Notably absent was any power to
balance the rights of the public against the interests of the landowner. Once all of the
appeals were determined, the agency issued the maps in conclusive form.234
Similar to laws regarding footpaths, CRoW prohibits anyone from posting a sign
“likely to deter the public from exercising” its access rights.235 Thus, any “Keep Out” or
“Trespassers Will Be Prosecuted” signs could result in substantial fines.236 On the other
side, the access authority (typically the local highway agency) may adopt by-laws
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regulating access rights, and the Countryside Agency has already issued a Code of
Conduct to guide the public and landowners.237
Not all land is eligible for access designation. The CRoW exempts land that is
plowed or used as a park or garden.238 Quarries, golf courses, and racecourses are also
exempt. No land within 20 meters (about 22 yards) of livestock buildings may be
included. CRoW also exempts any land covered by buildings, including the “curtilage”
of that land, which would normally include the yard or fenced area around a dwelling
house.239
Notably, the declaration of public access rights does not carry with it any right to
compensation. One justification, put forward when the government initially proposed the
scheme, was that, because access would be limited to land not currently used for
development or agriculture, the additional rights would not significantly harm private
landowners.240 The government has agreed to provide compensation for vehicular
access over common lands.241
Landowners were justifiably concerned about the possibility of liability to injured
roamers. What if a child decides to jump in a farm pond and drowns? What if a hiker is
injured by livestock or slips and falls down a rocky slope? CRoW attempts to address
these concerns by limiting the standard of care due owed to those exercising access rights
to the same level owed to trespassers, rather than the higher level owed to invitees or
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licensees.242 Moreover, the act specifically provides that land occupiers will incur no
liability for risks arising from natural features of the landscape, water (river, stream,
ditch, or pond), or passage across walls, fences, or gates (except for proper use of a gate
or stile).243 The landowner or occupier remains liable, however, for recklessly or
intentionally creating risks.244
CRoW is a remarkable transformation of the right to exclude others into a public
right to roam. For those landowners affected, the re-allocation of this stick in their
bundle of rights means that they will have diminished privacy and potential damage to
their land from a potential invasion of hikers or picnickers. Before Parliament passed the
Act, landowners complained that the burdens on them would be substantial. As we now
have some knowledge of early developments under this new regime, we can begin to
assess how the shift in access rights has worked so far.
B. Recent Developments
Several recent cases illuminate the adjustments required by landowners under
CRoW. In 2001, pop singer Madonna and her husband, film producer Guy Ritchie,
purchased Ashcombe House in south Wiltshire for £9 million (about $16.5 million). The
1,132-acre property includes a public footpath, which comes within about 100 yards from
the mansion where the family resides. Although this caused the singer some concern, she
at least knew about the footpath when she purchased the land and she has reportedly been
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pleased that so far walkers have not unduly invaded her privacy.245 However, the couple
did protest when the Countryside Agency announced its plans to classify about 350 acres
of their estate as “downland,” which qualifies as “open country” under the CRoW.246
That designation would give the public the right to walk across that portion of the
property at will. The famous couple objected at a public inquiry into the matter, arguing
that the land was not suitable as open country and that free access would violate their
privacy rights under the European Convention on Human Rights. An independent
inspector appointed to resolve the matter decided that only 130 acres, all of which were
out of sight of Madonna’s home, should be classified as downland and opened to access.
Because privacy was not therefore at issue, the inspector declined to consider the privacy
aspects of the case.247
Madonna’s case makes clear that CRoW does not allow privacy concerns to
outweigh the right to roam. The only considerations are whether the land can be
categorized as open country and whether it falls within a designated exemption.248
Because the act itself has provided, albeit in a limited fashion, for the accommodation of
landowner concerns, such as damage to crops or privacy, there is no room, even in the
extraordinary cases of celebrities, for additional balancing of those landowner interests.
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However, it remains to be seen whether extreme applications of CRoW could run afoul of
higher law, such as the European Convention on Human Rights.249
The European Human Rights Convention does mandate the protection of
individual property rights. Article 1 of the First Protocol (1P1) of the Convention states:
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public
interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general
principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in
any way impair the right of a state to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to
control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the
payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.250
The European Court of Human Rights has construed this provision as allowing
restrictions on use, without compensation, as long as there is a “fair balance” between the
public interest and the burden on the individual.251
The Human Rights tribunal had an opportunity to apply the Convention’s
property protections to CRoW in a recent case involving the Act’s amendments to the
government’s nature preservation powers.252 Under previous law, English Nature had
entered into a voluntary management agreement with the owner of a canal, under which
the owner agreed to extensive restrictions on use in exchange for £19,000 per year.253
Under the 2000 CRoW Act, however, no compensation was required for similar
restrictions, even though they clearly impeded the commercial activities of the canal
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owner.254 The court found that the impact of these restrictions could have a significant
economic impact on the landowner.255 Nevertheless, the court found that compensation
would not have to be provided if the benefit to the community outweighed the impact on
the landowner.256 In this case, the court found that preventing the landowner from
harming native flora and fauna was plainly in the public interest and need not be
compensated.257 The court therefore takes the sort of harm/benefit distinction explicitly
rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in Lucas.258
Most decisions regarding the application of CRoW involve more mundane
considerations, such as whether the land qualifies as mountain, moor, heath, or downland.
In cases challenging a designation, a government inspector conducts a visual inspection
and receives evidence from experts and others. The land must consist “wholly or
predominately” of the qualifying habitat, which calls for many discretionary
judgments.259
For example, landowners succeeded in removing a popular rock feature, Vixen
Tor in Dartmoor, from open country designation. The outcropping was considered a
landmark, which had been open to hiking for thirty years until the current owners closed
it in 2003. Later, the landowner was found guilty of attempting to change the character
of the land to improved grassland (which would take it out of CRoW classification) by

254

English Nature declared the area a Site of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI) under the 2000 Act, Part III,
which “effectively replac[ed] voluntary agreement with mandatory control.” Leven, at para. 14.
255
Leven, at para. 16 (impacts could be “severely detrimental”).
256
Id. at para. 58.
257
Id. at para. 71-72.
258
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1022-25 (1992)(criticizing harm/benefit
distinction in takings analysis). For an analysis of Leven, see Tom Allen, “Human Rights and Regulatory
Takings, 17 J. ENVTL. L. 245 (2005).
259
CRoW, Section 1.

52

clearing scrub and applying fertilizer.260 The Countryside Agency classified the land as
open access, due to its character as moor, but the landowners appealed. While the
inspector’s expert determined that the site “probably” had a predominance of qualifying
vegetation, certain assessment was difficult.261 The inspector concluded that, because
there was “some doubt” about the predominance of qualifying cover, the site should not
be mapped as open country.262 In protest of this decision, roamers staged demonstrations
at the site, including several mass trespasses.263 Eventually, the landowners offered to
open access under a ten-year agreement, for payments totalling £400,000, which they
said represented their costs.264 In response, the Dartmoor National Park authority offered
£1500 per annum. As of June 2006, the two sides had been unable to agree on an access
agreement and the site remains closed, despite continued sporadic protests.265
The Vixen Tor case illustrates that, without CRoW, landowners may be unwilling
to grant access without substantial compensation. The failure to provide compensation
for CRoW access thus represents the loss of a valuable property right. Nevertheless, the
shift in property rights effected by CRoW seems to be surviving claims that it
impermissibly undermines fundamental human rights. As discussed in Section IV
below, a similar result under American constitutional law could not be expected.

C. The Importance of Countryside Access
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"[T]his English country! Why any of you ever live in towns I can't think. Old, old grey
stone houses with yellow haystacks and lovely squelchy muddy lanes and great fat trees
and blue hills in the distance. The peace of it! If ever I sell my soul, I shall insist on the
devil giving me at least forty years in some English country place in exchange."266

To Americans, CRoW represents a rather remarkable idea -- that the public’s
interest in roaming across scenic lands outweighs the private property owner’s right to
exclude. While we have traditionally emphasized the privacy concerns of the landowner,
we have rarely considered the strength of the public side of the balance. This section will
discuss in more detail the interests that led to CRoW’s validation of the right to roam.
The British commitment to retaining access to the countryside seems to be
grounded some important public values, including providing for transportation by foot,
enhancing the enjoyment of nature, promoting mental and physical health, facilitating a
historical and cultural connection, and building a sense of community.
1. Means of transportation. The British tradition of walking in the countryside
was originally a matter of necessity. Footpaths or cross-country rambles were the
primary means of getting from place to place, especially for commoners with rare access
to a horse. Obviously, travel by foot usually is no longer required, when most people
have a car or bike, or can take a bus. But footpaths do provide a useful and pleasant
alternative to the paved road. Without the footpath, a nice one-mile walk to town, cutting
through neighbors meadows, could turn into a three–mile, dangerous trip on narrow,
circuitous paved roads without shoulders. Ensuring that it is easy to walk from place to
place may significantly reduce reliance on other forms of transportation.
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2. Enjoyment of Nature. Roaming rights and footpaths enable the walker to reach
places that are not yet spoiled by urban development, from which a road would detract.267
A hike may lead to a beautiful vista, or a mountain stream, surrounded by natural beauty
unblemished by concrete and steel. Walking through the scenery, such as hiking on a
footpath through a meadow of grazing sheep, puts you in the middle of the beauty, and
makes you a part of it, rather than simply observing it through a car window. The effect
is therefore more like a 3-D image than a picture postcard. Moreover, the slow pace
allows for a more intimate observation of the wildlife and plants that abound in the
countryside.
3. Mental health. Walking to town by a footpath allows the walker to
“rediscover something of a slower, quieter, more rooted existence,”268 an advantage that
becomes more important as the pace of life increases. Americans tend to view any
physical activity as a competitive event, and the walker striding purposefully down a
crowded street with hand weights and headphones is perhaps peculiarly American. In
contrast, the right to roam celebrates a type of walking that promotes peaceful reflection
and a sense of serenity. Marion Shoard, a strong proponent of the right to roam,
describes the countryside as a "repository of tranquillity."269
In Wordsworth’s “Tintern Abbey,” the poet basks in the pleasure of once again
viewing the rural landscape along the River Wye, exclaiming that the memory of “these
beauteous forms” sustained him through many nights in noisy cities, giving him a feeling
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of “tranquil restoration.”270 Wordsworth found nature to be the “anchor of my purest
thoughts, the nurse, the guide, the guardian of my heart, and soul of all my moral
being.”271 A walk in the country, therefore, was seen by Wordsworth and his followers to
be a powerful antidote to the “dreary intercourse of daily life.”272
4. Physical health.
Access to the countryside encourages a culture of walking that promotes physical
health. Being able to walk out your front door and within minutes be striding through
peaceful green meadows is more inviting than the typical American concrete nightmare.
Even Americans who live in the country may find it difficult to take a walk, being forced
by neighbors’ fences to use country roads with traffic and no shoulders for walkers. Even
if the road has a shoulder, the noise, exhaust and danger detracts from its desirablity for
healthy and pleasant exercise. Footpaths or roaming rights make it possible to walk to
town for lunch or for shopping instead of hopping in the car.
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These beauteous forms,
Through a long absence, have not been to me
As is a landscape to a blind man's eye:
But oft, in lonely rooms, and 'mid the din
Of towns and cities, I have owed to them
In hours of weariness, sensations sweet,
Felt in the blood, and felt along the heart;
And passing even into my purer mind,
With tranquil restoration:
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Health officials in the United States have strongly advocated more walking for
Americans, in the face of a growing obesity problem. Recent studies indicate that about
two-thirds of American adults are now overweight.273 The Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention now ranks obesity second only to tobacco use as a preventable cause of
death, attributing an astounding 400,000 deaths per year to being overweight. In
addition to unhealthy eating habits,274 lack of exercise is the main culprit. Europeans, as
any tourist can tell you, tend to walk a lot more than the average American.275 In part,
this is due to the design of their cities and towns, which encourage and enable walking,
and roaming rights are an extension of that.
A prime example of the difference in culture is that, in the United States, many
golf courses will not allow you to walk; a golf cart is required to ensure speed of play.276
Even where the course doesn’t require a cart, at many courses it is rare to find a walker
among the carts. In contrast, on the Old Course at St. Andrews, the most venerated golf
course in the world, only those who can provide documentation of a permanent disability
can use a “buggy” and no carts are allowed at all on some of the St. Andrews’ courses.277
In fact, most courses in Europe require you to walk unless you are elderly or disabled.
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Footpaths and roaming rights are just another example of this cultural emphasis on
walking.
5. Connection to history, culture.
There is a distinct pleasure in walking a path you know villagers have walked for
centuries before you. The use of land in the same way as those previous inhabitants
results in a connection to the past, to one’s ancestors, through the land itself. Washington
Irving, an American visiting Britain, captured the concept beautifully when he wrote
approvingly of “the stile and footpath leading from the churchyard, across pleasant fields
and along shady hedge-rows, according to an immemorial right of way.” He believed the
paths “evince a calm and settled security, and hereditary transmission of homebred
virtues and local attachments, that speak deeply and touchingly for the moral character of
the nation.”278 This connection to the past, tied to a sense of morality, can inspire and
motivate preservation of rustic scenes, of which footpaths and roaming have always been
a part.
Perhaps Thomas Hardy was thinking of this feature of a walk in the countryside
when he wrote “Wessex Heights” in 1896:
There are some heights in Wessex, shaped as if by a kindly hand,
For thinking, dreaming, dying on, and at crises when I stand,
Say, on Ingpen Beacon eastward, or on Wylls-Neck westwardly,
I seem where I was before my birth, and after death may be.279

Even in the United States, legal recognition of a historic connection to land is
quite common. In Iowa, for example, century farms, which have been in the same family
for at least 100 years, are entitled to special land use protection, to honor a family’s
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multi-generational relationship with the land.280 In adverse possession law, the law
recognizes the psychological attachment to land that comes with continued use over
time.281 Historic preservation laws preserve old associations and a sense of history and
continuity in our culture. Likewise, arguments for wilderness protection in the United
States have emphasized their connection to America’s pre-Columbian heritage.282 Thus,
in some ways, walking an ancient traveled way serves in part as an outdoor, interactive
museum and in part like a visit to the cemetery.
6. Sense of community.
The public’s use of footpaths and roaming rights also evokes a sense of
community, due in part to a sense of the shared ownership of the land.283 Instead of “my
land” and “your land,” it is “our land.” Community is also enhanced by the chance
meetings of neighbors that occur along the path. In cars, even if you recognize someone
whizzing by, you can barely manage a wave before they are gone. On a footpath,
greetings are always exchanged and typically, there is time to stop and converse. Even
with strangers, the unwritten code of the footpath requires a greeting and often a chat
about the weather, the path ahead, and more.284
The right to roam also represents a tribute of sorts to the common man. Taplin
notes that “[f]ootpaths were made by common men who were obliged to go afoot; they
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are open to all.” She notes the incident in Pride and Prejudice when Elizabeth Bennett
crossed “field after field at a quick pace, jumping over stiles and springing over puddles.”
By using the commoner’s route, “she incurred the class scorn of the Misses Bingley for
her muddy petticoat and red cheeks, but she claims the approval of Jane Austen and her
readers for her independence and indifference to form.”285 For Britain, which has always
had a hyper-sense of class differences, the right to roam is not just a “public” right, but
more specifically a right of those who do not belong to the landed gentry, and therefore, a
right to be protected as fiercely as the right to a decent wage or universal health
insurance.286 In a similar vein, Elihu Burritt referred to footpaths as “the inheritance of
our landless millions.”287
At the same time, public access to private lands helps to break down class
differences by establishing a connection between the commoner and the landed gentry.
On the footpath, everyone is equal, regardless of who owns the land. Instead of the
imposing exclusivity of the modern American gated community, the English footpath
allows the poorest plebeian to walk right across Madonna’s estate.

Conclusion
Thus, the public interest supporting a right to roam over private land stems from a
variety of significant social values. Its strongest appeal may be the sense of “tranquil
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restoration,” as Wordsworth called it, that a walk in the country brings. In that way,
countryside access is cheaper than psychological counseling and given its physical
benefits, may reduce national health costs as well. Of course, the private property
owner’s right to exclude, against which these public benefits are balanced, is also
supported by strong policy reasons, which will be discussed more fully below.

IV. Access Rights in United States in Comparison
“An American farmer would plough across any such path. . . but here, it is protected by
law, and still more by the sacredness that inevitably springs up, in this soil, along the
well-defined footprints of the centuries. Old associations are sure to be fragrant herbs in
English nostrils, we pull them up as weeds.”
- Nathaniel Hawthorne288

In the United States, the balance between public and private rights to land is
tipped decidedly toward the landowner. Public access rights are much more limited,
although there are some rare instances of easements established by customary use.
Moreover, as a matter of constitutional law, a legislative curtailment of the right to
exclude, by recognizing a right to roam as in CRoW or even more limited public access
rights, would be impossible to sustain without compensation. The contrast in approach
stems not only from the differences in the two countries’ legal systems, but also from
cultural differences that have their roots in the history of United States land development.
A. History of U.S. Land Development
In Britain, as we have seen, the public’s claim to greater access rights is grounded
firmly in their historic use of the property before enclosure. Although the history of land
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tenure in Britain is complex, its origin in a feudal system resulted in land held subject to
the interests of many holders. After the Norman conquest, monarchs were deemed the
eminent owners of all property and parceled out large tracts to lords by royal edict.289 In
return for services, a tenant might hold certain property of the lord, but neither could be
said to be absolute owner.290 Of necessity, the commoners living on or near the land had
to be taken care of, and common rights arose as a natural consequence. Commoners
made great use of the lord’s wastelands, which lords countenanced or tolerated. From an
economic standpoint, it would have been impossible for the lords to police their
wastelands, and since they didn’t derive necessary income from them, the expense of
policing did not merit the cost. Historically, then, “ownership” of British property has
always been subject to the rights of others, either the kings above or the tenants or
commoners below.
In the United States, of course, for the most part land was distributed from to
individual landowners in fee simple without encumbrances.291 Some commons
arrangements did exist in the colonies, but in most instances the colonists quickly
reverted to a private ownership scheme. Professor Ellickson has described how private
property rights in the colonies led to economic prosperity, after communal ownership led
to economic disaster.292 Commons arrangements also existed in other parts of the new
nation, but by the early 19th century, such arrangements were virtually extinct.293
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In Dividing the Land, Edward T. Price details how American land was parceled
out in the first instance. He notes that immigrants were attracted to the United States
precisely because of the opportunity for freehold tenure.294 From the beginning, a
premium was placed on development, to help the colonies to gain a better foothold in the
new world. An immigrant was given a parcel of land in fee (typically around 50 acres),
but the freehold was perfected only by actually settling and cultivating the land.295 Thus,
while English lords could allow their land to lie fallow without fear it would be lost, the
American settler knew that the land would be his only if it were transformed into
productive property.
As the country expanded west under the ideal of “manifest destiny,” settlers
willing to brave the wilds were given expansive property rights as a reward. Again,
under the various Homestead Acts, a premium was placed on establishing ownership by
excluding others, with fences or walls, and putting the land into useful production.
Common rights were not considered, both because they were not necessary, but also
because they were antithetical to the whole ideal of development and enclosure.296
Timing also had something to do with the difference in property distribution; by the time
most of the United States was being settled, commons systems were on their way out in
all modern societies.297
Despite these fundamental differences, there are some parallels to the British
experience of common rights preceding enclosure. The best examples come from the
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West, where ranchers used the open range as a vast grazing commons and cowboys drove
cattle hundreds of miles over open lands in the late 1800s. On the Chisholm Trail, for
example, a typical cattle drive would move a herd of a few thousand cattle across the Red
River from Texas through Oklahoma up to the railroad stop at Abeline, Kansas, a
distance of several hundred miles. There were many other routes established by the cattle
drives. Similarly, traders established the Santa Fe Trail from Missouri to New Mexico,
which the government recognized as a public road in 1848.298 Settlers moving West used
the Oregon Trail, over 2000 miles long, to reach the West Coast from Missouri.299
Yet, these paths are relatively minor compared to the fabric of paths criss-crossing
England. Moreover, although some of them became highway rights of way, most of
these trails fell into disuse and were abandoned as public easements. Settlements were
laid out in uniform patterns, with the idea that streets and roads would accommodate
travel by carriage and by foot. Therefore, footpaths or other public access rights were not
typically reserved in government grants of land.
Although the United States based its legal doctrine on the received common law
of Britain,300 American courts were quick to adapt those rules to the peculiar
circumstances of the new nation. The stronger version of property rights that resulted
may have grown out of a variety of conditions that differed from the old world. The
greater opportunity for and broader distribution of land ownership in the U.S., for
example, may have reduced the need for public rights and lessened the class-based
tension between landholders and non-landholders. Many large landowners in Britain
could trace their holdings to grants from royalty and land was largely concentrated in a
298
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small group of aristocratic owners. Commoners resented the idea that “the privileged few
could dictate the terms on which the countryside was used.”301 In contrast, the American
landowner class was much larger and less exclusive, and, having for the most part earned
their property through labor (homesteading) or service in a war, the public presumably
felt they had earned the right to exclude.
Finally, differing cultural mores developed, which are reflected in the literature
and fables of the two countries. Britain produced “The Selfish Giant,” by Oscar
Wilde,302 where a giant turns the local children out of his garden and puts up a sign
indicating that “Trespassers Will Be Prosecuted.” The result of this exercise of the right
to exclude is catastrophic: Spring refused to return to the giant’s land until he finally
relents and lets the children back in.303 Keeping natural beauty away from the public is
portrayed as evil and insisting on the right to exclude is selfish.
Similarly, in “The Secret Garden,” a classic English children’s book published in
1912 by Frances Hodgson Burnett, two neglected children use nature and exercise to heal
their own physical and mental health. The children’s discovery of the beauty of the
gardens, as well as the surrounding moors, instills a belief in the regenerative power of
contact with the natural world, very similar to the policy behind the right to roam. And
significantly, the garden is supposed to be off-limits to the children, but only by breaking
through that barrier do they find happiness and well-being.304
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On the other hand, Americans grow up with stories of Paul Bunyan, celebrated for
his nature-clearing prowess, such as cutting down 23 trees with one swing of his ax.305
The classic Laura Ingalls Wilder and Willa Cather books celebrate pioneers, primarily
homesteaders, and the hard work they did to make the land their own.306 Western novels
and movies depict the struggle for dominion over the open range as an effort to bring
human control to wild territory.307 Although certainly too much can be made of the
cultural distinction, most would agree that is it extremely unlikely that an American
author would have written a children’s book like “The Selfish Giant,” which overtly
denigrates the zealous defense of private property rights.
B. Public Access to the Countryside in the United States
In the United States, public access to scenic areas will typically be found in some
form of government-owned property, such as a park. Public easements in rural areas are
mostly limited to old railroad easements opened for public recreation under the Rails to
Trails Act. And, while a few states have recognized, in limited instances, the public’s
common law right to access beaches or other public places, for the most part courts have
not been willing to grant public easements absent a strong case for implied dedication.
As a result, there is nothing in the United States to compare to the footpaths of Britain,
now augmented by the right to roam.
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Americans do enjoy a wealth of trails on public lands, allowing long hikes
through the breathtaking beauty of national parks, forests and wilderness areas.308
Several long-distance trails -- such as the Appalachian Trail (2,160 miles), the Pacific
Crest Trail (2655 miles), and the Continental Divide Trail (3,100 miles) -- simply dwarf
their British cousins. Many states have long-distance trails, too. The Centennial Trail in
South Dakota, for example, spans 111 miles through the Black Hills and Custer State
Park. The 225-mile KATY Trail in Missouri nearly crosses the entire state.
Although these trails provide exceptional recreational opportunities, they do not
serve exactly the same functions as the footpath and roaming rights discussed above.
Except for the trails located on old railroad easements, these long-distance trails are
found almost entirely on vast expanses of public lands (national or state parks or forests),
which almost by definition are remote from civilization and inaccessible to all but serious
hikers. These are not trails for the person who just wants to take a walk before dinner.
In many cases, even those who live nearby have to drive to get to a trailhead.309
This is not to denigrate these trails – they are a magnificent achievement and
glorious for those who have the time and ability to get to them. But they are also in
keeping with the American tradition of separating nature from human habitation.
Although some modern developments are incorporating more greenbelts and trails, for
the vast majority of Americans there is still no possibility of walking out the front door to
reach a trail.
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C. Common Law Public Access Rights
In the United States, public rights of way may be established by prescription or
implied dedication, but in general courts do not recognize customary rights.310
Customary rights typically would allow a court to open a entire category of lands (e.g.,
beachfront property) to public access, which would avoid the case-by-case determination
of public use required under an implied dedication claim. Prescriptive rights are even
less advantageous, as they may allow access only for adjacent landowners rather than the
public in general.
The New Mexico Supreme Court’s recent treatment of an easement by
prescription claim illustrates the difficulty of attempting to establish a right of way based
on historic use. In Algermissen v. Sutin,311 the court rejected a claim by neighbors to
continue their long-time use of a dirt path over defendants’ property to reach a state park
for recreational purposes (jogging, horseback riding, hiking, etc.). The court found
sufficient evidence to conclude that the neighbors had the implied permission of the
landowners. Evidence of permission from the 1940’s was sufficient to support a
presumption that the use remained permissive into the 1990’s.
The court also discussed another possible impediment to a prescriptive claim, the
“neighbor accommodation” exception, under which a court does not presume adverse use
when the "claimed right-of-way traverses large bodies of open, unenclosed, and sparsely
populated privately-owned land."312 Although the court limited the application of this
doctrine to expansive tracts of land, where owners could not reasonably be expected to
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have knowledge of the intrusion, it would effectively preclude many claims attempting to
establish roaming rights in remote scenic areas. The neighbor accommodation doctrine
does, however, encourage landowners to allow neighbors to freely traverse their property,
knowing that they are not thereby in danger of relinquishing their right to exclude.
Obtaining access to private land based on implied dedication is equally difficult.
Courts require that the landowner somehow indicate an intention to dedicate the right of
way and, as the South Carolina Supreme Court put it, “[d]edication is not implied from
the permissive, sporadic and recreational use of the property.”313
Easements based on public customary use, such as the village green cases in
England,314 are not generally favored in the United States. In Graham v. Walker,315 the
Connecticut Supreme Court rejected a claim for a right of way based on custom.
Residents of Blissville argued that their inhabitants, from time immemorial, had used
defendant’s land to get to nearby Taftville and therefore claimed to have established a
customary right of way. The Connecticut Supreme Court noted that such an easement in
gross could be established in England, but refused to apply English law, noting that the
state’s “political and legal institutions have from the first differed in essential particulars
from those of England.”316 A right of way held by villagers in gross, the court
determined, could not be recognized under American law.317 However, the court was
willing to allow a claim of a prescriptive easement, established by continuous use for the
statutory period, in favor of appurtenant landowners.
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Limiting prescriptive rights only to other landowners explicitly favors one class
(those wealthy enough to own land) over another (renters or homeless). Courts may have
adopted this dividing line as a means of preventing easements from becoming overly
burdensome. By limiting the right of way to other landowners, whose land may be
reciprocally burdened in the same way, the rights would necessarily be limited in scope.
However, the result is that the public in general, and more specifically those who can’t
afford to own property themselves, are excluded. Thus, the prescriptive easement, even
if it can be established, would not be the equivalent of the British footpath, open to all.
The most prominent decision recognizing access based on custom came from the
Supreme Court of Oregon in State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay,318 in which it recognized a
public right of access to oceanfront beaches.319 Relying on the English doctrine, the
court found that the public had used the dry sand area along Oregon’s Pacific coast “as
long as the land has been inhabited.”320 Requiring a beach-by-beach determination based
on prescription, the court found, would be unduly burdensome and unnecessary. “Oceanfront lands from the northern to the southern border,” the court determined, “ought to be
treated uniformly.”321
In a later case, the Oregon Supreme Court determined that this declaration of
public access rights based on custom did not constitute a taking of beachfront owners’
property rights. In Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach,322 the court held that, under Lucas,
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the public’s right of access should be considered one of the “background principles” of
state law that inhere in every property owner’s title.323 Therefore, the property owner
never had a right to exclude the public from the beach and the recognition of that in
Thornton did not destroy a previously existing right.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the Cannon Beach case,
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice O’Connor, dissented from the certiorari denial.324 Justice
Scalia laced his opinion with expressions of doubt about whether the Oregon Supreme
Court was “creating” rather than “describing” the custom of public access.325
Nevertheless, the majority of Court declined to interfere with this allocation of the right
of access to the public.
The Oregon right of customary beach access comes closest to the British
recognition of an easement for the general public for recreational purposes. The doctrine,
however, prevails in only one state and has been expressly rejected by several others.326
Moreover, even in Oregon the public right of customary access is limited to beachfront
property.
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D. Constitutional Limitations on Public Access: The Right to Exclude
The most salient difference between United States and British property law is the
limitation on government intrusion contained in the takings clause of the 5th Amendment
to the American constitution. CRoW’s reallocation of property rights, without
compensating the landowners, would almost certainly have been struck down by
American courts as an unconstitutional taking. In Britain, however, there is no
constitutional property protection, although Parliament has provided compensation for
most significant impacts on landowners. In this case, however, compensation was not
provided because Parliament felt that the impact on landowners would be minimal and
not worth the cost of setting up a compensation mechanism. After all, allowing the
public to walk over lands such as mountains or moors, that were not really being used for
anything anyway, would not preclude any existing uses. That sort of balancing approach
to the question of compensation, however, has been banished in American courts, by
Supreme Court precedent requiring a categorical approach to the right to exclude.
The “right to exclude” has been enshrined in the United States as “one of the most
essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.”327
The Supreme Court first made this pronouncement in Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
which involved the public's right to access a private pond that had been dredged and
converted into a marina by connecting it to the nearby bay. The government argued that
this action subjected the water to the federal navigational servitude that covers all waters
of the United States. The Court, however, rejected that argument, holding that the
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imposition of such a servitude would amount to a taking of property without
compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment.328
In so holding, the Court explicitly determined that the "'right to exclude,' so
universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right, falls within th[e]
category of interests that the Government cannot take without compensation."329
Interestingly, for this view of the right to exclude as "fundamental," the Court cited only
three sources: a Claims Court case,330 a Fifth Circuit case,331 and Justice Brandeis's
dissent in an intellectual property case.332 None of these sources really support the notion
that the right to exclude must be absolute. The Claims Court case, for example, deals
with the exclusive occupancy necessary to establish "Indian title."333 The Fifth Circuit's
mention of the right to exclude was pure dicta, occurring in a discussion of when the risk
of loss passes to a buyer of goods.334 And Justice Brandeis (a lone justice, in dissent)
quickly qualified his comment about the right to exclude by noting that it could indeed be
modified if "the property is affected with a public interest."335
Despite the slender reed upon which the Court declared the "right to exclude" to
be "fundamental" and "essential," later cases used Kaiser Aetna to further solidify the
absolute nature of this stick in the bundle. In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV,
the Supreme Court held that even the de minimus intrusion of a cable TV box could not
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be countenanced without compensation.336 If a small, mute and stationary object violates
the Court's categorical right to exclude, then a “right to roam” or other public easement
surely would be insupportable.
Indeed, in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n,337 the Supreme Court explicitly
held that the imposition of a public right of way in exchange for a building permit
constituted a taking of property, which required compensation to sustain it.338 The
public’s need or desire for the easement did not avoid the constitutional proscription
against taking a property right without paying for it. Moreover, the Court held, the right
to build on the property could not be conditioned on the grant of an easement, a scheme
the Court likened to “extortion.”339
In dissent, Justice Brennan noted that the development condition was in fact
consistent with “settled public expectations,” shaped by the California constitutional
provision prohibiting private landowners from obstructing the public’s access to
navigable waters.340 Thus, Brennan concluded, “California has clearly established that the
power of exclusion for which appellants seek compensation simply is not a strand in the
bundle of appellants’ property rights.”341 Brennan also noted that the burden on the
landowners would be slight, because their privacy would not be appreciably infringed by
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the few feet of right of way, as the public could already pass by the house from the wet
sand portion of the beach.342
Justice Brennan’s balancing of interests and willingness to find a public easement
inherent in the landowner’s bundle of sticks is much more akin to the rationale justifying
the “right to roam,” but of course his views did not prevail in Nollan.343 Thus, unless
previous use had ripened into a right by prescription or implied dedication,344 the type of
public right of way conferred by CRoW could be obtained in the U.S. only by
compensating the landowner.345 The legislature could decide to reallocate the sticks in the
bundle, but only by compensating the losing party.
Congress apparently did just that in the “rails-to-trails” amendment to the
National Trail System Act (NTSA).346 Under the NTSA, the Interstate Commerce
Commission may preserve railroad rights of way for the future by allowing them to be
used, on an indefinite “interim” basis, as recreational trails.347 Under the terms of most
railroad easements, the right of way is lost when railroad use is abandoned; at that point,
full use and ownership of the property would revert to the fee owner, usually the adjacent
landowner. Congress effectively re-wrote the terms of these easements by declaring,
342
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legislatively, that recreational trail use would not constitute “abandonment” and
therefore, the landowner’s reversionary interest was not triggered.
This type of readjustment in the bundle of sticks is not countenanced by American
courts without compensation. When adjacent landowners claimed that the NTSA
amounted to a taking of their property, the Supreme Court, in Presault v. Interstate
Comerce Comm’n,348avoided answering the question by directing them to seek a remedy,
if a taking had occurred, under the Tucker Act.349 Subsequently, the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit held that the conversion of the easements to recreational trail use had
worked a taking, requiring compensation.350 The government had argued that adjacent
landowners never really had any reasonable expectation of recovering the land free of the
easement; thus, its conversion to trail use did not really take anything. The court,
however, adopted a formalistic analysis, finding that the trail was a physical occupation
of plaintiffs’ land, and therefore constituted a taking.351
The government also argued that the original scope of the easement, for railroad
purposes, could be construed to include other public uses, such as recreational hiking and
biking. Although Vermont state law, which applied to the easement interpretation,
allowed the scope of the easement to be adjusted to fulfill its purpose in changing
circumstances, the court found that the nature of recreational trail use was too different
from railroad use to fall within its scope.352 While trains were noisy, they were also
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limited in their frequency, whereas recreational users may be present at any time and they
may be more difficult to contain within the easement’s boundaries.353
The Rails-to-Trails case indicates how strictly American courts view the right to
exclude. Even though to many, a hiker or a biker would seem much less of a burden on
the adjacent landowner than a passing train, courts refuse to engage in any balancing of
burdens in protecting the right to exclude. Any intrusion is actionable, and even where
the public owns a right of way, its scope will be strictly construed. The case strongly
indicates that any attempt to impose an easement along the lines of CRoW would not be
sustainable absent compensation.

E. Arguments for Additional Public Access Rights
“[A]t daybreak I am the sole owner of all the acres I can walk over. It is not only
boundaries that disappear, but also the thought of being bounded. Expanses
unknown to every deed or map are known to every dawn, and solitude, supposed
no longer to exist in my county, extends on every hand as far as the dew can
reach.”
- Aldo Leopold354
Given the differences between the two countries, in history, culture, and legal
systems, is there anything America can learn from the British adoption of the right to
roam? Of course, it is extremely unlikely our state or federal legislature will suddenly
decide to adopt the equivalent of CRoW here, even if it were constitutional. Yet, the
story behind CRoW contains some interesting lessons Americans could profit from
studying.
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First, as I have pointed out in at greater length elsewhere,355 Britain’s right to
roam represents a rather dramatic re-allocation of one of the sticks in the property rights
bundle from the landowner to the public. The example teaches us that the composition
of the bundle is not necessarily immutable, and that changes may be desirable to better
reflect contemporary society’s needs and values. Of course, the relative stability of
property rights is extremely valuable, because it honors settled expectations and therefore
promotes economic transactions and furthers our desire for fairness. But property rights
must evolve and the right to roam reminds us that, in the end, the recognition of the
private owners’ rights involves a trade-off with public interests that should not be
ignored.
Second, the right to roam represents a welcome return to a more interrelated,
functional approach to property, which we once thought to be banished to the wastebins
of history. Stuart Banner has pointed out that Americans have become so accustomed to
the distinction between public and private property, we have lost the ability to imagine
possible gradations between the two.356 We have public property, for hiking and
wandering, and private property, to stay off of. Property theorists spend a lot of time on
the question of whether property is best held by private owners or in common, but very
little on anything in-between.357 The right to roam reminds us that it is possible to allow
the public certain limited uses, while leaving the fee in private hands. There are
numerous ways, in other words, to allocate the bundle of sticks without abandoning the
idea of private property in general.
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Finally, the right to roam suggests that we should consider whether we have
undervalued the public access side of this equation, and whether there are ways,
consistent with our own culture and legal framework, to further the important public
interests represented by CRoW.358 It is, in fact, possible to construct a strong argument in
favor of modifying the formalistic notion of an absolute right to exclude. Interestingly,
none of the other “sticks” in the landowner’s bundle have acquired the categorical status
of the right to exclude. Yet, there is little reason to support the absolute form of the right.
In terms of morality, there are strong arguments to be made in favor of more
public rights to private property. Many philosophers assert that land is, at bottom, the
“common inheritance” of all.359 We may have parceled it out for reasons of economic
efficiency and fairness, but there is no moral imperative against allowing access. Indeed,
the moral argument suggests that true freedom should include the right to walk wherever
one pleases, unless the landowner can make a case that it is unduly burdensome.360 We
would balk, presumably, at allowing private owners to cut off our ability to boat down
the Mississippi, because it would interfere with our freedom to travel. Why do we allow
our right to travel over land to be cut off at every fencepost?
In economic terms, the argument for an absolute right to exclude fares no better.
In enacting the right to roam, Parliament weighed the potential for damage to individual
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landowners from public intrusion and found very little to be concerned about, with regard
to these types of land – mountains, moors, heath, and downland – where crops would not
be growing and little damage could be done. The value to the public, however, as
described in Section III above, was much higher than the expected costs. Naturally,
given the estimated costs and benefits, it would be possible for individual landowners to
reach agreements with the public regarding access rights, in exchange for compensation.
But the transaction costs of reaching individualized agreements for access would prevent
them in most cases.361
Professor Ellickson suggests, however, that the right to exclude may be more
economically efficient than the right to roam:
If decentralized negotiations between Blackstonian neighbors cannot be
counted on to generate an efficient transportation network, why shouldn't a
group simply confer on its members reciprocal and routine privileges to
transport themselves across all private land? The reason is manifest:
entrants may damage crops, commit thefts, and do other mischief.
Reciprocal rights of passage would undermine the basic virtue of
parcelization, namely, the relative ease with which a person can monitor
boundary crossings, as opposed to the quality of an entrant's behavior. If
privileges of passage were routine, guard dogs and motion detectors would
lose most of their usefulness.362
Ellickson goes on to posit that exceptions to the general right to exclude occur only when
they are efficient: e.g., where “the would-be entrant would objectively value entry far
more than the landowner would objectively suffer from the entry” or where the burden of
monitoring the trespass would be slight.363 In addition, the likelihood of damage to the
landowner from the trespass should be considered: “The less vulnerable a tract is to
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damage, the more likely nonowners are deemed privileged to enter it.”364 Finally,
Ellickson suggests that modifications to the right to exclude should be sensitive to
transactions costs associated with gaining the owner’s permission to enter.365
These considerations seem to support the right to roam as set forth in CRoW.
Parliament has chosen specific categories of land that contain the most elements of scenic
beauty, thereby representing high value to the public, while at the same time presenting
little potential for damage. Moreover, because landowners probably rarely spend much
time or resources monitoring their moors or mountains, in most cases, monitoring costs
probably would not greatly increase. These are not lands where it is likely that public
entrants will “damage crops, commit theft or do other mischief,” because there is little to
steal and no crops are grown on the mountain and moor. Of course, it may be that the
British “code of conduct,” the unwritten law governing public behavior when exercising
the right to roam, makes the intrusion less worrisome as well.
Thus, as long as the right to roam is limited to those types of land where the
balance tips most strongly in favor of public use, it likely comports with economic
principles. H.G. Wells put it more succinctly, in expressing his support for a right to
roam anywhere “where his presence will not be destructive of its special use, nor
dangerous to himself, nor seriously inconvenient to his fellow citizens.”366 Mill similarly
argued that public access should not be denied “except to the extent necessary to protect
the produce against damage, and the owner’s privacy against invasion.”367 According to
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Mill, “[t]he species at large still retains, of its original claim to the soil of the planet
which it inhabits, as much as is compatible with the purposes for which it has parted with
the remainder.”368
Short of a revolution in American thinking about the right to exclude, however, it
is difficult to imagine serious modifications to the right to exclude anytime soon. It is
much more useful, therefore, to imagine other ways to facilitate movement toward greater
public access. It is possible, for example, that many landowners would voluntarily allow
the public to use their lands for roaming. For those lands, there are a number of minor
impediments that could be easily removed. First, there is a lack of information. While it
is easy to find the “no trespassing” sign, landowners rarely hang out a “trespassers
welcome” sign. The state government agency in charge of natural resources could
facilitate the collection and dissemination of information about which areas are “open for
walking,” perhaps in the form of a map. Legislation could provide a voluntary
mechanism for registering land as open for access, while providing rules for those taking
advantage of the scheme to lessen damage or privacy concerns. Landowners would be
encouraged to allow hikers if they could be assured that they would be immune from
liability for any injuries and that the use could not ripen into some sort of prescriptive
easement.
Recognizing the clear public benefits from additional access to the countryside
might also lead legislatures to investigate greater use of their condemnation authority for
this purpose. We readily condemn land for highways to ensure automobiles can go from
Point A to Point B, but often seem reluctant to use that authority to allow people to walk
merely so as not to disturb wild animals they wanted to hunt. Mill called it an “abuse” of the right of
property. Id.
368
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there. Public access could also be made a condition of government payments for
agricultural conservation set-asides.
The British experience reminds us of the importance of ensuring public access to
natural areas, even those on private lands. Americans, however, are more likely to use a
different set of tools to achieve that goal. As the nation matures and the cultural baggage
of the homestead era begins to fade, we may begin to place more emphasis on the
public’s freedom to roam and less on protecting an absolute right to exclude.

V. Conclusion
“[A] race that neglects or despises this primitive gift, that fears the touch of the soil, that
has no footpaths, no community of ownership in the land which they imply, that warns
off the walker as a trespasser, that knows no way but the highway, the carriage-way, that
forgets the stile, the footbridge. . . is in a fair way to far more serious degeneracy.”
- John Burroughs369

Unfortunately, Burroughs may have had the United States in mind in describing
his view of a degenerate society. It is clear that the American public places far less value
on a countryside walk than the British do. Partially, it is due to a much harsher climate,
so that it sometimes seems that the weather moves from intolerably hot and humid to
intolerably cold without many days of glory in between. Nevertheless, many lament our
separation from the environment: as we move from our air-conditioned house to our airconditioned car to our air-conditioned office, we can go weeks at a time without coming
in contact with nature. We can get exercise, surely, at the health club, but it is most
often while watching CNN or listening to our Ipod. Along the way to this hermetically
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sealed existence, we may have lost something that a walk in the countryside might help
us regain.
Britain’s right to roam can easily be derided by critics as the product of a society
verging on socialism.370 The review of the historic progression of access rights in Britain
shows that CRoW can also be seen as the restoration, in part, of a freedom that
commoners lost during the enclosure period. It can also be viewed as a step back toward
a functional approach to property rights, moving away from a strictly spatial system, and
achieving a greater good. Moreover, it can be seen as a refutation of Blackstonian
absolutism, proving that furthering the goals of our property rights system requires
balancing private and public interests, rather than a categorical right to exclude. And
perhaps the right to exclude is not as “essential” a stick in the bundle as the Supreme
Court has heretofore regarded it.
In Scandinavia, “allemansrätten” give everyone the right to cross the private
property of another. Allmansrätten translates, very simply, into “the rights of everyone.”
Look out across the countryside where you live and ask, why shouldn’t I have the right to
go there? Look at a nearby mountain and ask, is the view from peak no less mine than
the ocean or the river? Would my life be different if I could walk out my front door and
head across the hills, to discover who knows what? Shouldn’t true freedom include that
fundamental right? Britain’s resurrection of the right to roam causes us to ask these
questions. Perhaps we will arrive at somewhat different answers than the British have,
but they are undoubtedly questions that need to be asked.
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